[EM] Strategy-free criterion

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> I am curious what your definition of "visible from the ballots" is. It's
> possible
>
to generate scenarios where the sincere CW is one of two frontrunners and
> yet still
> loses under practically all methods, because they lose necessary support
> (from
> truncation) from supporters of the other frontrunner while most of the CW's
> supporters actually prefer a different candidate to the CW.

Am I missing something about the CW under approval? I was under the
impression that, if everyone is following the polls and knows everyone
else's voting intentions, the majority-preferred candidate will win because
people will adjust their approval threshold until the CW is the only
candidate with >50% approval.

That would surprise me, but who knows.

Huh, why would it surprise you?

On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 11:57 AM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:

> Hi CLC,
>
> >> Something I will have to post about at some point is what a
> game-changer it
> >> is if we take it as an assumption that elections will have two
> frontrunners
> >> and all voters use frontrunner truncation strategy. Arbitrary-looking
> majority
> >> rules prove very useful in maximizing performance.
> >
> > I think there's a big issue with assuming two frontrunners because A) in
> that case,
> > it's just a majority vote between them and B) you can have situations
> where
> > multiple candidates have strongly correlated scores, e.g. if they're all
> from the
> > same party.
>
> It seems like you think I meant that a method identifies the frontrunners.
> It could
> try, but that isn't inherent to what I'm saying. I'm talking about an
> assumption
> about the environment methods will run in. And I don't propose any
> assumptions
> about how the perceived frontrunners are chosen.
>
> > This is why I previously suggested that, ideally, a system should
> satisfy both
> > zero-info honesty and LNHe+FBC. This seems like the maximally-honest
> combination
> > of properties, because it handles low-information elections honestly, and
> > high-information elections "as sincerely as possible" (i.e. no
> order-reversal,
> > which is enough to guarantee the Condorcet winner is visible from the
> ballots).
>
> I am curious what your definition of "visible from the ballots" is. It's
> possible
> to generate scenarios where the sincere CW is one of two frontrunners and
> yet still
> loses under practically all methods, because they lose necessary support
> (from
> truncation) from supporters of the other frontrunner while most of the CW's
> supporters actually prefer a different candidate to the CW.
>
> > STAR works off of a very similar principle. The hope is the first stage
> will find
> > two similar frontrunners, and then the second stage is strategyproof
> (since it's a
> > majority vote). This combination fails both criteria in theory, but
> might satisfy
> > them in practice. That's especially true if you combine it with other
> improvements:
> > countbacks, a master lever for straight-ticket voting, and skipping the
> runoff if
> > the top-two finishers are from different parties could maximize the
> chances of
> > STAR working as it should.
> >
> > I think the best hope for a system that formally satisfies both criteria
> is
> > probably somewhere in the generalized median family of voting methods.
>
> That would surprise me, but who knows.
>
> Kevin
> votingmethods.net
>
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