[EM] Strategy-free criterion

Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Thu Jun 13 12:25:40 PDT 2024


Markus,

Thanks for the interesting link.

Quoting Mike Saari from March 1996:

> I want to emphasize, that even Smith//Condorcet[EM] fails to
> meet this "Twins" Litmus Test.

What is the definition of the "Smith//Condorcet [EM]" method?

Chris B.

On 14/06/2024 12:50 am, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Hallo,
>
> in 1997, I proposed the following version for the
> strategy-free criterion:
>
> *************************************************
>    "X >> Y" means, that a majority of the voters prefers
>    X to Y.
>
>    "There is a majority beat-path from X to Y," means,
>    that X >> Y or there is a set of candidates
>    C[1], ..., C[n] with X >> C[1] >> ... >> C[n] >> Y.
>
>    A method meets the "Generalized Majority
>    Criterion" (GMC) if and only if:
>    If there is a majority beat-path from A to B, but
>    no majority beat-path from B to A, then B must not
>    be elected.
> *************************************************
>
> See:
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html 
>
>
> Advantage of this version is that it is not necessary to
> presume that there was a Condorcet winner when every
> voter cast a complete ranking of all candidates.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list 
> info
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