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<p>Markus,<br>
<br>
Thanks for the interesting link.<br>
<br>
Quoting Mike Saari from March 1996:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>I want to emphasize, that even Smith//Condorcet[EM] fails to
meet this "Twins" Litmus Test.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
What is the definition of the "Smith//Condorcet [EM]" method?<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 14/06/2024 12:50 am, Markus Schulze
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:9adc6fed-ccde-40fd-b834-d4a249f4e6e0@gmail.com">Hallo,
<br>
<br>
in 1997, I proposed the following version for the
<br>
strategy-free criterion:
<br>
<br>
*************************************************
<br>
"X >> Y" means, that a majority of the voters prefers
<br>
X to Y.
<br>
<br>
"There is a majority beat-path from X to Y," means,
<br>
that X >> Y or there is a set of candidates
<br>
C[1], ..., C[n] with X >> C[1] >> ... >> C[n]
>> Y.
<br>
<br>
A method meets the "Generalized Majority
<br>
Criterion" (GMC) if and only if:
<br>
If there is a majority beat-path from A to B, but
<br>
no majority beat-path from B to A, then B must not
<br>
be elected.
<br>
*************************************************
<br>
<br>
See:
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html</a>
<br>
<br>
Advantage of this version is that it is not necessary to
<br>
presume that there was a Condorcet winner when every
<br>
voter cast a complete ranking of all candidates.
<br>
<br>
Markus Schulze
<br>
<br>
----
<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for
list info
<br>
</blockquote>
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