[EM] Open letter to STAR voting promoters

[robert bristow-johnson]

> On 06/05/2024 8:55 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
> 
> What do you think of  Adam Tarr's old idea of using  A-B-C--D-E-F 
> "grading" ballots with the idea of using them to infer ranking to elect 
> a Condorcet winner and if there isn't one then interpreting the A-B-C 
> grades as Approval?

Why not just A-B as Approval?  Or why not A-B-C-D as Approval?  Or why not just A as Approval (I know that would result in Condorcet-Plurality).  What rhyme or reason is used to determine where the Approval cutoff is?

> He liked Condorcet//Approval but also possible with these ballots is 
> Smith//Approval and  Margins-Sorted Approval and a few others.
> 
> I don't see such a big problem with high-resolution score ballots as 
> long as it is made clear to the voters (and is true) that their 
> approximate ratings of the candidates will work just as well for them as 
> their exact ones.

Please take a look at these templates for RCV legislation: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DGvs2F_YoKcbl2SXzCcfm3nEMkO0zCbR/view .

Even though the actual legislation is not verbatim with these templates, the IRV template (first one) has actually been used for the content of the ballot question for an initiative for IRV.  The second template has BTR-IRV.

Now consider the last three templates ("Straight-ahead Condorcet").  So this is specifically about what to put in subdivision (4) to replace:

"(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate having the plurality of first preferences is elected."

What exactly will the language be to replace that line of code?

"(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then ..." what?

Perhaps,

"(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate receiving the most first and second preferences is elected."

I might call that Condorcet-Bucklin.  Bucklin and Approval have something in common and that common property is that it's "counting marks" and not counting people.  This may be perceived by some legal analysts as violating One-person-one-vote, I dunno.

Would that be a little more resistant to the burying strategy than Condorcet-Plurality?  How about comparing it to Condorcet-TTR, which is nearly Condorcet-IRV?

"(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the two candidates receiving the most first preferences shall runoff against each other and the candidate in that pair that is preferred over the other by the greater number of voters shall be elected."

How would MO's "wv-Condorcet" be worded? (Since he is apparently not plonking me as was threatened.)

It needs to be short and sweet.  ("Sweet" means that it ostensibly elects the candidate with the "greatest" voter support, however that voter support is defined.  But the definition of that "greatest" voter support needs to be simple and understandable and make sense to pedestrians.)

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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