[EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?

[Ted Stern]

See my other thread on Pairwise Median Ratings.

I proposed using pairwise as the tie breaker for highest median rating,
then fall back to MRscore as a last resort if there is a cycle in the top
MR group.

In essence, it would be a form of Condorcet//Approval in the set of
candidates meeting the threshold (after the original Condorcet failed to
find a single CW), with the median rating as the approval. A kind of
Approval runoff, if you will. So Condorcet//MR//Condorcet*//MRscore
overall.

In the other thread, I use Smith instead of Condorcet as the first pass to
satisfy immunity from irrelevant ballots (and blank ballots).

In any case, this method reverts to Condorcet//implicit Approval if no
candidate is ranked by more than 50%.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 16:44 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Okay, then it has a reasonably brief definition, & is based on something
> with precedent.
>
> I recently thought that ER-Bucklin was promising, & advocated it here, but
> then noticed a strategy-problem.
>
> It was my impression then that gaps wouldn’t solve the problem.
>
> Delaying a vote bestowal to Z can protect against helping Z beat someone,
> Y, whom  you like better before Y gets your vote…but it can also prevent
> you from helping Z, in time, against someone worse.
>
> So I gave-up on Bucklin.
>
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:39 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Median Rating is just ER-Bucklin with gaps allowed.
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 15:11 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I’d have to understand it better. I’ll study it.
>>>
>>> If Median-Ratings is like Majority-Judgment, its need for a special
>>> tiebreaker complicates it. Simplicity is important for a 1st Condorcet
>>> proposal.
>>>
>>> When you described it, I assumed that it was Majority-Judgment—but now
>>> I’ll take a closer look.
>>>
>>> So, till then…
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:05 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Michael,
>>>>
>>>> I see you like Condorcet//Approval(implicit).
>>>>
>>>> What about Condorcet//Median Ratings?
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, 09:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of
>>>>> the other Condorcet-compliant methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> …& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy
>>>>> (against offensive-strategy)?
>>>>>
>>>>> Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] <
>>>>> lists001 at robertjrichard.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>>>>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why
>>>>>> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of
>>>>>> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to
>>>>>> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election
>>>>>> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is
>>>>>> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --Bob Richard
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------ Original Message ------
>>>>>> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>>>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>>>>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That question was recently asked.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>>>>> organization.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>>>>> candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence
>>>>>> its particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully
>>>>>> reassure our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t
>>>>>> too-vote an evil.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it
>>>>>> in various nonpolitical votes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact
>>>>>> a voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise
>>>>>> happened for RCV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards,
>>>>>> online, in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment
>>>>>> committee, for the pursuit of an initiative.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions,
>>>>>> such as:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> MinMax(wv)
>>>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish
>>>>>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online,
>>>>>> to find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>>>>> initiative-enactment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
>>>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240112/0facb854/attachment.htm>