[EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Nanson has precedent, but it doesn’t have the simplicity of some of the
other Condorcet-compliant methods.

…& how does Nanson do by freedom from need for defensive-strategy (against
offensive-strategy)?

Achieving the best strategy-free-ness is the goal of Condorcet.

On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 12:08 Bob Richard [lists] <
lists001 at robertjrichard.com> wrote:

> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn why
> it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing mention of
> this episode, so this research would probably involve traveling to
> Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, county election
> records and the public library. On the other hand, this part of Michigan is
> a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>
> --Bob Richard
>
> ------ Original Message ------
> From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>
> That question was recently asked.
>
> Condorcet has many versions, & there’s no agreement on that matter.
>
> So Condorcet doesn’t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization.
>
> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates,
> in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>
> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
> our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn’t too-vote an
> evil.
>
> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
> various nonpolitical votes.
>
> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
> voting-system reform. That’s happened for RCV.
>
> …or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
> for RCV.
>
> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in
> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the
> pursuit of an initiative.
>
> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as:
>
> MinMax(wv)
> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>
> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>
> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don’t like & don’t wish
> to beat the CW via burial.
>
> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
> initiative-enactment.
>
> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they’d support in an initiative.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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