[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

Thu Feb 29 19:16:07 PST 2024

Well, with each voter, one at a time,  individually-considered as not
showing up, all that’s needed is to decrement the pairwise vote-totals that
s/he’d added to.

Much less votecounting than what would be needed if it were necessary to
keep repeating the whole exhaustive pairwise count, as I’d previously
assumed.

So surely the Participation-check would be computationally-feasible.

On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 18:09 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that
> need to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is
> proportional to V^4.  I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but
> might that be computationally feasible?
>
> On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>
>> I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
>>
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
>>
>> Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by
>> many Condorcet methods,  Participation only matters in elections when there
>> is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
>> strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
>>
>> I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
>> and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
>> Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
>> explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
>> candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
>> Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
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>>>    1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
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>>> Message: 1
>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
>>> From: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>> Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
>>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>> vulnerable
>>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
>>> Germany.
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>>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
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>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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>>>
>>> It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>>> It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.
>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s
>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>
>>> I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price
>>> for
>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>
>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>> that
>>> single-winner elections aren?t perfect.  ?making a good argument for
>>> PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>
>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany feels
>>> no need to compromise participation.
>>>
>>> We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>> world?s
>>> countries for about a century.
>>>
>>> But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck in
>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>>> to
>>> democracy.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>> methods
>>> > have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>> vulnerable
>>> > to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen
>>> in
>>> > Germany.
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