[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

Thu Feb 29 18:09:15 PST 2024

With V voters, the number of individual pairwiwe-preference-votes that need
to be counted in order to test for Participation-failure is proportional to
V^4.  I don't know how fast the fastest computers are, but might that be
computationally feasible?

On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 2:43 PM Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:

> I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:
>
> https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/
>
> Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many
> Condorcet methods,  Participation only matters in elections when there is
> not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable
> strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.
>
> I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity
> and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about
> Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to
> explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the
> candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked
> Robin (i.e. Copeland)).
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
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>>    1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)
>>    2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)
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>> Message: 1
>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800
>> From: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>> Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>> vulnerable
>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
>> Germany.
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>> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>
>> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists
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>> It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
>> It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.
>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s
>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>
>> I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>
>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>> that
>> single-winner elections aren?t perfect.  ?making a good argument for
>> PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>
>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany feels
>> no need to compromise participation.
>>
>> We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the
>> world?s
>> countries for about a century.
>>
>> But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck in
>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>> to
>> democracy.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>> methods
>> > have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>> vulnerable
>> > to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
>> > Germany.
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