[EM] Is there a Good Clone Independent Election Method Based on VFA Style Ballots?

[Joshua Boehme]

Two questions came to mind...

1. The cost function isn't symmetric. How do you translate it into a distance between two orderings, then? For example, if A is 70% for/30% against and B is 60%/40%, then the cost of going from A>B to B>A is 28% and vice versa is 18%.

2. Once you narrow it down to the two most-distant orderings, how do you pick the final one? Yes, it's probably "obvious" to a human, but you can't write a law or program that way. Once we have a rule to formalize that, though, why wouldn't we just directly use it to create a "better than" relationship for all the orderings instead of relying on a two-step process?


On 2/1/24 17:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
> VFA abbreviates "Vote For and
> Against"
> 
> More than a decade ago I thought of using VFA syle ballot information to
> declone Borda, Copeland, and Kememy-Young ..but none of them was suitable
> for public proposal.
> 
> For example, VFA information allows us to construct a clone independent
> "Swap Cost Mettic" that can replace the clone dependents Kendall-tau
> metric, thereby resulting in a clone free version of Kemeny-Young ...
> which, in turn transforms it into an election method with acceptable
> properties ... but only  ncorporatimg the VFA information to create the
> clone independent metric without being able to dispense with the voter
> rankings ... a gasoline/ electric hybrid that cannot exist as a standalone
> power source, so to speak.
> 
> However, last night it occurred to me that we can use the soap cost metric
> on the space of possible candidate finish orders to make a comceptually
> simple (vsry  simple in comparison with Kememy-Young) standalone election
> method:
> 
> Choose the finish order most distant from its opposite.
> 
> This makes simse when you realize that the cost of a single trasposition of
> a pair of candidates in the finish order is a measure of the combined
> mental anguish that would result from reversing their first and last place
> prferemces.
> 
> To be precise, the seap cost of reversing a single preference of X>Y to.Y>X
> in the finish order is the number of nallots that voted for X times the
> number that voted against Y.
> 
> If you were toouble the number of voters that voted for X or the number
> that voted against Y,, you would double the total number of voters
> disappoimted by the seap of the positions (in the finish order) of the
> respective candidates A and B ... so the "cost" in seap cost is measured in
> voter disappoiment.
> 
> In our context the greater the voter disappointment cost of reversing a
> proposed finish order FO o its opposite FO', the better FO is in contrast
> to FO' ... which is why we chopse the finish order that would result in the
> most disappointment if it were replaced by its opposite..
> 
> An app that uses this method for making group decisions based solely on
> first and last choices might catch on at the grass roots level. If so, it
> would work even better in large groups where statistical laws would enhance
> performance.
> 
> What do you think?
> 
> Is there a VFA organization somewhere in need of revitalization?
> 
> -fws
> 
> 
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info