[EM] The critical importance of Precinct Summability.
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at munsterhjelm.no
Thu Aug 15 02:34:39 PDT 2024
On 2024-08-13 17:23, Filip Ejlak wrote:
> Aside from the general usefulness/importance of summability, in this
> specific case the Venezuelan system's summability does not make a
> difference in exposing the election as stolen. The (real) winner got,
> like, 70% of the votes? In such a situation, you don't need the method
> to be summable, it being majoritarian is enough. Similarly, if there's a
> non-summable Condorcet method but election results have no Condorcet
> cycle, we can still verify the winner with summable information. Of
> course cycles do happen sometimes, so the question remains if this would
> be transparent enough or not.
>
> Perhaps a better way to do presidential elections - I don't know, giving
> it up for debate - would be to do an actual, manual 2nd voting round
> with two or three candidates from the Smith set (only if there's a top
> cycle, of course). One-round summable methods' vulnerability is quite a
> disadvantage, but two summable rounds might do the trick in this respect.
That could well be a good idea, at least for the "noise" sort of cycle
that has been observed so far. The 2021 Minneapolis Ward 2 election
seems to have been mostly up to random noise:
https://electowiki.org/wiki/2021_Minneapolis_Ward_2_city_council_election
and focusing on the Smith set for a runoff would have made clear if
there were any real differences in voter opinion between the three.
I do know that some jurisdictions (particularly American) really don't
like runoffs, so that may count against it. And if the political system
evolves (due to supporting a wider range of opinions), then it's
possible that cycles could start happening more often.
-km
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