[EM] The critical importance of Precinct Summability.
Filip Ejlak
tersander at gmail.com
Tue Aug 13 08:23:11 PDT 2024
Aside from the general usefulness/importance of summability, in this
specific case the Venezuelan system's summability does not make a
difference in exposing the election as stolen. The (real) winner got, like,
70% of the votes? In such a situation, you don't need the method to be
summable, it being majoritarian is enough. Similarly, if there's a
non-summable Condorcet method but election results have no Condorcet cycle,
we can still verify the winner with summable information. Of course cycles
do happen sometimes, so the question remains if this would be transparent
enough or not.
Perhaps a better way to do presidential elections - I don't know, giving it
up for debate - would be to do an actual, manual 2nd voting round with two
or three candidates from the Smith set (only if there's a top cycle, of
course). One-round summable methods' vulnerability is quite a disadvantage,
but two summable rounds might do the trick in this respect.
wt., 13 sie 2024, 04:55 użytkownik robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> napisał:
>
>
> > On 08/12/2024 4:59 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Chris: I agree with you that the importance of precinct summability is
> often exaggerated. If you tallied all results on election night, using
> two-way communication, this would fix the problem if you've received all
> ballots by election night (since you can post round-by-round results).
>
> The two-way communication is not transparent and skeptics (or conspiracy
> nuts) will claim that the two-way communication is not secure.
>
> Either way it's unnecessary if you have Precinct Summability.
>
> > That said, it's not useless, because lots of US states don't do that.
> The main issue is whether states will in practice actually adopt practices
> required for safe IRV elections.
>
> Hare RCV (IRV) will never be as transparent nor as secure as Condorcet RCV
> when the number of candidates exceeds 3 because it lacks Precinct
> Summability. All other things equal, there will always be a difference in
> degree of transparency and to the degree of security/integrity of the
> election. Condorcet will always (4+ candidates) have a property of
> transparency that Hare lacks and will always have a property of
> security/integrity that Hare lacks.
>
> > So far, they haven't.
>
> FairVote and RCVRC do not help. The difference between misinformation and
> disinformation is whether they're drinking the Kool-Aid or they're serving
> the Kool-Aid. FairVote and RCVRC are serving the Kool-Aid.
>
> I'm sticking to my story: Precinct Summability exposed the Venezuelan
> election as stolen. It didn't prevent it, but that's because of the
> strength and corruption of the government over the opposition. And, in
> principle, if they didn't have precinct summability and kept the tabulation
> of the vote completely opaque (because, say, they required all the ballot
> data to be opaquely transported from polling places to the central
> tabulation location), then they could have stolen the election and none of
> us would be the wiser.
>
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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>
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