[EM] Maximal lotteries (was :Re: The critical importance of Precinct Summability.)
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at munsterhjelm.no
Sun Aug 11 08:22:05 PDT 2024
On 2024-08-08 17:53, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> I suspect the uncovered set might be slightly better because it's a
> close approximation of the bipartisan set that isn't too hard to
> explain. Maximal lotteries also have some very nice strategy-resistance
> properties.
You've referred to the maximal lottery and strategic voting before. I'd
like to know in more detail what you're referring to by your statements.
In the Monroe post, you said:
> If group strategy was a reasonable model of voters, it wouldn't
> matter which electoral system we picked, because the outcome would
> always be maximal lottery.
What do you mean? Do you mean that:
- Every (non-strategyproof) method has a unique Nash equilibrium per
election under group strategy, whose expected outcome is that election's
maximal lottery,
- Every method has the maximal lottery as one of its Nash equilibria,
- The relation between group strategy and the maximal lottery only holds
for some methods, and these methods have the ML as their unique Nash
equilibrium,
- As above, but "as one of its Nash equilibria".
or something else entirely?
> On this topic and the lack of focus on proportional representation
> mentioned elsewhere, I think it would be super useful to have some kind
> of strongly-summable PR algorithm. ElectoWiki claims Ebert's method is
> summable
> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Summability_criterion#Multi-winner_generalizations_and_results>, but the link is broken and Ebert has some big issues (e.g. negative response and Pareto inefficiency).
I tried to look at the forum through IA and I couldn't find any mention
of strong summability; it must have been in a later post on that thread,
which IA hasn't archived. So at best that needs a {{cn}}.
To my knowledge, whether Droop proportionality is compatible with strong
summability is still open. I have a very broad idea of how one might
resolve summability questions like this, but I would need some
mathematical primitives that I'm not sure how to construct.
-km
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