[EM] Approval ballots in "Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?

[Michael Ossipoff]

True. Though if the biggest can’t succeed that means it’s a good method, if
the smallest *can* succeed that means it’s a bad method.

So maybe best to check for both.

On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 19:56 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> I think it is quite a bit more egregious if the Condorcet faction can be
> successfully buried by a smaller faction, especially if the Condorcet
> faction is the largest.
>
> So simulation information that casts light on how methods vary on that
> score would be interesting.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 30/04/2024 5:06 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> When you do that simulation, I hope that you’ll repeat each simulated
> election, but with the largest losing-faction burying the CW.
>
> …recording & reporting, for each Condorcet-complying method, the ratio of
> burial’s successes to burial’s backfires (in which it elects someone whom
> the buriers like less than the CW).
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:48 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:
>> > Kristofer,
>> >
>> > How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?
>>
>> That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the simulation
>> myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that says where the
>> cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances (which stand in
>> for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my simulator doesn't
>> support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style either yet.)
>>
>> Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm CCing this
>> post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in "Four
>> Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?
>>
>> In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used above-mean utility
>> thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the winner)
>> don't have to care about utility at all: that process just tries
>> approval ballots at random until something works.
>>
>> -km
>> ----
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>>
>
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