[EM] Droop compared with Hare Quota

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Funnily enough, I'm actually thinking that wiki article needs to be
rewritten from scratch (probably into a section on a broader article on
electoral quotas). It doesn't do a very good job of going over the
tradeoffs between the two quotas, which are:
1. Droop preserves majorities. (A candidate with a majority of the vote
will always win a majority of seats.)
2. Droop is less vulnerable to strategy, because a Droop quota can always
enforce their preferences over another candidate (if a Droop quota prefers
A to B, then bullet voting A ensures A has more support than B).
3. Hare is *unbiased*, making it more proportional than Droop; every party
will, on average, receive a number of seats proportional to their share of
the vote. Droop is biased towards large parties.
4. Anti-Droop (nonstandard name; divide by n-1 instead of n+1) will always
preserve minorities (a party with less than a majority of the vote will
always receive less than a majority of the seats). Anti-Droop is biased
towards small parties. I've never seen a serious proposal for it.

Most mathematicians consider quota methods inferior to divisor methods in
general; HH+Webster satisfy quota in practice anyways.

On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 12:38 PM Joseph Malkevitch <
jmalkevitch at york.cuny.edu> wrote:

> This Wiki article may help explain the "issues" related to the use of the
> Droop and Hare quotas.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_the_Hare_and_Droop_quotas
>
> Best,
>
> Joe
>
>
> ——————————————
> Joseph Malkevitch
>
> Email:
> jmalkevitch at york.cuny.edu
> Web page:
> http://york.cuny.edu/~malk/
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240424/8ac7a936/attachment-0001.htm>