[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Richard, the VoteFair guy]

On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:

 > Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car
 > or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it
 > designed to only guard against another crash just like the most 
recent one.

Actually I'm moving a poorly designed car body (fenders, roof, doors, 
etc) from a poorly designed chassis (wheels, brakes, engine, drive 
train, etc) to a well-designed chassis (new wheels, new brakes, new 
engine, new drive train, etc).  Later we can replace the poorly designed 
body with a better-looking body.  Then we'll have a well-designed car.

To clarify, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and using ranked 
choice ballots is the "chassis" in this analogy.  IRV's rule of assuming 
the candidate with the fewest highest-ranking marks is least popular is 
the "body" that isn't well designed.


 > For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict
 > ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign
 > way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In
 > Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as
 > "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking
 > the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.

In Australia your voters write a ranking number (for each candidate) in 
a box.  So you only need one box per candidate.

Here in Oregon we use a pen to fill in empty ovals on a paper ballot.

Too many ovals (beyond about seven) per candidate inflates the paper 
ballot size to unreasonable dimensions.  Already, with just one oval per 
candidate, the ballot covers both sides of a large paper ballot, and 
sometimes there are two ballot pages.

As a result, ballot "real estate" prevents us from printing as many 
choice columns as candidates.

This limitation, plus the silly rule of not correctly counting two or 
more marks in the same choice column -- so-called "overvotes" -- stops 
us from being able to rank all other candidates above our most-disliked 
candidate.


 > Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this
 > seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions
 > that sum to 1.

Yes, those of us who understand math recognize that decimal numbers work 
fine.  But few voters, and very few politicians, understand math. 
Especially fractions and decimal numbers.

 > But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes
 > more than two candidates at the same ranking level?

That error is almost similar to truncating the decimal numbers to the 
nearest smallest integer.  The "almost" refers to a few ballots that 
can't be "paired up with" an equivalent preference pattern.

That "pairing" also works with three ballots with the same three 
top-ranked candidates.  And it works with four ballots ranking the same 
four candidates highest.  Etc.


 >>> If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you
 >>> from giving them names? ...

 >> Time and money.

 > I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the
 > mass media or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was
 > just talking about just for the purpose of (hopefully
 > somewhat rigorous) discussion here.

My time is still a huge limiting factor.  I'm juggling lots of projects. 
  That's why I don't have time to reply to as many messages here as I'd 
like.


Chris, I'm grateful that your messages are well-written.  That makes 
them easier to reply to.  Thank you for taking the time to write clearly!

Richard Fobes
The VoteFair guy


On 4/22/2024 9:23 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> Richard,
> 
>> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because STAR a clever way to improve
>> single-winner score voting.
> It trashes Score voting's compliance with Favorite Betrayal and 
> Participation to gain merely Condorcet Loser. Pure genius. If it is an 
> attempt to "improve" Score voting (which I have great difficulty 
> believing) then I don't agree that it qualifies as "clever".
> 
>> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
>>   > giving them names? ...
>>
>> Time and money.
> I wasn't talking about for the purpose of discussions in the mass media 
> or to get text books or dictionaries changed.  I was just talking about 
> just for the purpose of (hopefully somewhat rigorous) discussion here.
> 
>> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
>> plurality is unnecessary.
>>
>> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> 
> I agree that that should be avoided. As you would know if you read my 
> previous posts here about STAR, the strategic burden it places on the 
> voter is vastly greater than the one imposed by plurality (aka FPP).
> 
> Both have Compromise incentive while STAR also has very strong Push-over 
> incentive.
> 
>> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
>>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
>>   > strategy.
>>
>> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
>> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
>> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>>
> For IRV (aka Hare) I am strongly in favour of allowing unlimited strict 
> ranking from the top. I was talking about a reasonable relatively benign 
> way of dealing with equal-ranking in defiance of the ballot rules. In 
> Australia I think the whole ballot is not counted, and binned as 
> "informal".  Normally there should be nothing stopping you from ranking 
> the most evil candidates strictly below all the others.
> 
>> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."  It's not
>> a "complex procedure":
>>
>> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
>>  When shared preference levels are encountered,
>> //  the ballots are transfered in "whole" numbers,
>> //  not by splitting a ballot into fractional or
>> //  decimal portions.  For example, during a
>> //  counting cycle, if there are two ballots that
>> //  rank candidates numbered 1 and 2 at the same
>> //  highest ranking level, one of the ballots will
>> //  transfer to candidate 1 and the other ballot
>> //  will transfer to candidate 2.
>> //
> 
> Assuming you can pair up all the "over-voting" ballots in this way, this 
> seems to be equivalent to dividing the votes up into equal fractions 
> that sum to 1. But what if you can't pair them all off, or someone votes 
> more than two candidates at the same ranking level?
> 
> I didn't express myself quite clearly enough. The "complex procedure" I 
> referred is the one I, not you, suggest.  I didn't bother describing it.
> 
> I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or Benham, 
> then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more than one 
> candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of the candidates 
> by counting those ballots as equal fractions summing to 1.
> (A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a third 
> of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on.  Now it would be fine for 
> this to be the final order for deciding which candidate to next 
> eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes Push-over strategising 
> easier.)  Then we count the equal top (among remaining candidates) 
> ballots again, this time they give a whole vote to whichever of the ones 
> they equal rank to the one that was highest in the provisional order. 
> (So an A=B ballot gives a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher 
> in the provisional order, and of course nothing to B.)
> 
> This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I think 
> you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing above-bottom 
> equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor do I think there 
> would be any significant demand for that from voters, so I don't 
> advocate allowing it for those methods.
> 
>> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
>> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
>> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> It is the most basic theory that all remotely reasonable methods fail  
> IIA, so why are we even mentioning that?  And isn't "center-squeeze" 
> just a vague concept used in anti-IRV propaganda? What is the precise 
> definition of a "center-squeeze failure"?
> 
> Your approach is like that of a quite bad and sloppy designer of a car 
> or a plane. Every time it crashes you just stick another kludge on it 
> designed to only guard against another crash just like the most recent one.
> 
> Chris B.
> 
> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org 
> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3C632ea079-e977-441c-bf19-41522d2d8eee%40votefair.org%3E>
> /Sat Apr 20 10:30:57 PDT 2024/
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> 
>   > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
>   > ...
>   > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
>   > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> 
> Horrible, yes.  Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> single-winner score voting.  It's useful among friends when voting is
> not anonymous.  Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> 
>   > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping you from
>   > giving them names? ...
> 
> Time and money.  Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> election-method reform.
> 
>   >>   Approval voting requires tactical voting.  There's no way to avoid it.
>   > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
>   > FPP.  ...
> 
> Our goal is to rise way above plurality.  Accepting limitations of
> plurality is unnecessary.
> 
> Why impose any extra strategic burden on the voter?
> 
>   >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls "overvotes."
>   >> RCIPE counts them correctly.  ...
>   > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
>   > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that point.
>   > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
>   > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to Push-over
>   > strategy.
> 
> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates.  Truncation means the
> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> 
> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes."  It's not
> a "complex procedure":
> 
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> 
>   >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
>   >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
>   > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet failures, you
>   > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
>   > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that we can
>   > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
>   > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
>   > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> 
> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska.  But those were
> not just Condorcet failures.  They also were IIA failures,
> center-squeeze failures, etc.
> 
> I want fewer failures in real elections.  I don't care about convoluted
> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> 
> Again, thank you for this useful discussion.  I appreciate that you
> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> 
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
> 
> 
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