[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
Closed Limelike Curves
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Sun Apr 21 10:00:03 PDT 2024
In that case, since every system needs to have some strategic burden, is
the goal to minimize the total amount of effort spent on strategy? To
minimize the probability that strategic voting by a coalition could affect
the result? To minimize the effects of strategy on the results?
Say a system makes it easy for any voter to work out the optimal strategy,
without needing a PhD in game theory, or relying on party-recommendations
(like in Australia). Is that good (makes strategy more democratic, reduces
the amount of effort spent on strategizing) or bad (makes strategic voting
easier)?
On Sat, Apr 20, 2024 at 4:48 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 1:12 PM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> >> Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?
> > True, we should just have km be dictator and save them the trouble of
> > voting. ;)
>
> OK, I should have included the word "extra" as follows:
>
> Why impose any EXTRA strategic burden on the voter?
>
> Richard Fobes
>
> On 4/20/2024 1:12 PM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> > /> Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?/
> > True, we should just have km be dictator and save them the trouble of
> > voting. ;)
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 20, 2024 at 10:32 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy
> > <electionmethods at votefair.org <mailto:electionmethods at votefair.org>>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> >
> > > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> > > ...
> > > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >
> > Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> > single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> > not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
> >
> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> > you from
> > > giving them names? ...
> >
> > Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote,
> and
> > academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> > election-method reform.
> >
> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> > avoid it.
> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
> with
> > > FPP. ...
> >
> > Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> > plurality is unnecessary.
> >
> > Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?
> >
> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> > "overvotes."
> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the
> ballot
> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> > point.
> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> > Push-over
> > > strategy.
> >
> > I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate --
> Gollum,
> > Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> > evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
> >
> > I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
> > not
> > a "complex procedure":
> >
> >
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> <
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp
> >
> >
> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> > failures, you
> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
> "Let's
> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> > we can
> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
> > so that
> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >
> > I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those
> were
> > not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> > center-squeeze failures, etc.
> >
> > I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about
> convoluted
> > scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
> >
> > Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> > really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
> >
> > Richard Fobes
> > The VoteFair guy
> >
> >
> >
> > On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > > Richard,
> > >
> > >> I regard HOW OFTEN failures occur to be much more important than
> a
> > >> checkbox that says "yes" or "no" failures of this kind NEVER
> occur.
> > > Given that voting methods are mostly simple and cut-and-dried and
> so
> > > plenty of 100% guarantees that criterion failures NEVER occur are
> > > available, I find the approach "Near enough is good enough! I am
> an
> > > expert. I've done a computer simulation" to be suspicious and
> flaky.
> > > That attitude can lead to people switching off their brains and
> > > swallowing BS propaganda from say STAR advocates.
> > >
> > >> It's easy to overlook the many failures that do not fit within
> NAMED
> > >> failure types. Those unnamed kinds of failures are being ignored
> > >
> > > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> > you from
> > > giving them names? Several of the voting methods criteria I
> > uphold and
> > > promote are ones I coined myself.
> > >
> > >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> > >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> > failures, you
> > > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument
> "Let's
> > > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> > we can
> > > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> > that
> > > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> > >
> > >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> > "overvotes."
> > >> RCIPE counts them correctly. That could become a huge deal in
> the
> > >> upcoming Portland election for mayor -- where two or more marks
> > in the
> > >> same "choice" column will be ignored as if those marks were not
> > on the
> > >> ballot.
> > > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> > point.
> > > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> > Push-over
> > > strategy.
> > >
> > >> I recognize that IRV's flaw is that the candidate with the fewest
> > >> transferred votes is not always the least popular -- as
> > demonstrated in
> > >> Burlington and Alaska.
> > > IRV (properly implemented, with unrestricted strict ranking from
> the
> > > top) doesn't have any "flaws". It simply fails some criteria that
> > some
> > > people like so that it can meet other criteria that some people
> > like. As
> > > Woodall put it, it has a "maximal set of properties".
> > > It is not garbage like STAR.
> > >
> > >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> > avoid it.
> > > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than
> with
> > > FPP. With FPP the best strategy is to vote for your favourite
> > among the
> > > candidates you think have a realistic chance of winning. With
> > Approval
> > > you just do the same thing and then also approve every candidate
> you
> > > like as much or better. An alternative is the simple "surprise"
> > > strategy: approve any given candidate X if you would be pleasantly
> > > surprised if X won or unpleasantly surprised if X lost.
> > >
> > > It's a huge "bang-for-buck" improvement on FPP. But I'm not a
> > big fan
> > > either.
> > >
> > >> * STAR ballots are a dead-end ballot type. (Always six columns,
> > even
> > >> when there are three or four candidates. And always with the
> > star icon,
> > >> no thanks!)
> > >
> > > I find this objection to be superficial and just about style. A
> > lot of
> > > ok methods can be happily used with 6-slot ratings ballots, such
> > as say
> > > ABCDEF grading ballots. STAR is a horrible method that is very
> > highly
> > > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> > >
> > > I welcome any comments you may have have about my poll favourite,
> > > Approval Sorted Margins. Or anything else related to my most
> > recent ballot.
> > >
> > > Chris
> > ----
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> >
> ----
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>
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