[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots
Richard, the VoteFair guy
electionmethods at votefair.org
Sat Apr 20 16:46:38 PDT 2024
On 4/20/2024 1:12 PM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
>> Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?
> True, we should just have km be dictator and save them the trouble of
> voting. ;)
OK, I should have included the word "extra" as follows:
Why impose any EXTRA strategic burden on the voter?
Richard Fobes
On 4/20/2024 1:12 PM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> /> Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?/
> True, we should just have km be dictator and save them the trouble of
> voting. ;)
>
> On Sat, Apr 20, 2024 at 10:32 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy
> <electionmethods at votefair.org <mailto:electionmethods at votefair.org>> wrote:
>
> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > ... It is not garbage like STAR.
> > ...
> > ... STAR is a horrible method that is very highly
> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
>
> Horrible, yes. Garbage, no, because it's a clever way to improve
> single-winner score voting. It's useful among friends when voting is
> not anonymous. Or when "dishonest" exaggeration cannot be hidden.
>
> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> you from
> > giving them names? ...
>
> Time and money. Unlike two STAR promoters, the folks at FairVote, and
> academic professors, I'm not getting paid to promote or advance
> election-method reform.
>
> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> avoid it.
> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> > FPP. ...
>
> Our goal is to rise way above plurality. Accepting limitations of
> plurality is unnecessary.
>
> Why impose any strategic burden on the voter?
>
> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> "overvotes."
> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. ...
> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> point.
> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> Push-over
> > strategy.
>
> I and most voters want to be able to rank an evil candidate -- Gollum,
> Voldemoron, etc. -- below all other candidates. Truncation means the
> evil candidate is as acceptable as other "bad" candidates.
>
> I've written code that correctly counts so-called "overvotes." It's
> not
> a "complex procedure":
>
> https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp <https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp>
>
> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> failures, you
> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> we can
> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV
> so that
> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
>
> I'm bothered by the failures in Burlington and Alaska. But those were
> not just Condorcet failures. They also were IIA failures,
> center-squeeze failures, etc.
>
> I want fewer failures in real elections. I don't care about convoluted
> scenarios that would never occur in a real election.
>
> Again, thank you for this useful discussion. I appreciate that you
> really want to understand why I rank some methods better than others.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
>
> On 4/19/2024 1:15 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Richard,
> >
> >> I regard HOW OFTEN failures occur to be much more important than a
> >> checkbox that says "yes" or "no" failures of this kind NEVER occur.
> > Given that voting methods are mostly simple and cut-and-dried and so
> > plenty of 100% guarantees that criterion failures NEVER occur are
> > available, I find the approach "Near enough is good enough! I am an
> > expert. I've done a computer simulation" to be suspicious and flaky.
> > That attitude can lead to people switching off their brains and
> > swallowing BS propaganda from say STAR advocates.
> >
> >> It's easy to overlook the many failures that do not fit within NAMED
> >> failure types. Those unnamed kinds of failures are being ignored
> >
> > If there are "failure types" in need of names, what's stopping
> you from
> > giving them names? Several of the voting methods criteria I
> uphold and
> > promote are ones I coined myself.
> >
> >> Avoiding any failures in REAL elections is what I'm "buying" by
> >> advocating RCIPE instead of IRV.
> > I'm still baffled as to why, if you don't like Condorcet
> failures, you
> > don't simply advocate a Condorcet method. How is the argument "Let's
> > lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so that
> we can
> > somewhat more often elect the Condorcet winner" better than
> > "Let's lose strict compliance with several criteria met by IRV so
> that
> > we can ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner"??
> >
> >> Another difference from IRV is about what FairVote calls
> "overvotes."
> >> RCIPE counts them correctly. That could become a huge deal in the
> >> upcoming Portland election for mayor -- where two or more marks
> in the
> >> same "choice" column will be ignored as if those marks were not
> on the
> >> ballot.
> > I think it is reasonable to treat ballots that (against the ballot
> > rules) equal-rank above bottom as though they truncated at that
> point.
> > Doing otherwise (as I think you advocate) without a quite complex
> > procedure I suggest makes the method a bit more vulnerable to
> Push-over
> > strategy.
> >
> >> I recognize that IRV's flaw is that the candidate with the fewest
> >> transferred votes is not always the least popular -- as
> demonstrated in
> >> Burlington and Alaska.
> > IRV (properly implemented, with unrestricted strict ranking from the
> > top) doesn't have any "flaws". It simply fails some criteria that
> some
> > people like so that it can meet other criteria that some people
> like. As
> > Woodall put it, it has a "maximal set of properties".
> > It is not garbage like STAR.
> >
> >> Approval voting requires tactical voting. There's no way to
> avoid it.
> > The strategic burden on the voter is certainly no greater than with
> > FPP. With FPP the best strategy is to vote for your favourite
> among the
> > candidates you think have a realistic chance of winning. With
> Approval
> > you just do the same thing and then also approve every candidate you
> > like as much or better. An alternative is the simple "surprise"
> > strategy: approve any given candidate X if you would be pleasantly
> > surprised if X won or unpleasantly surprised if X lost.
> >
> > It's a huge "bang-for-buck" improvement on FPP. But I'm not a
> big fan
> > either.
> >
> >> * STAR ballots are a dead-end ballot type. (Always six columns,
> even
> >> when there are three or four candidates. And always with the
> star icon,
> >> no thanks!)
> >
> > I find this objection to be superficial and just about style. A
> lot of
> > ok methods can be happily used with 6-slot ratings ballots, such
> as say
> > ABCDEF grading ballots. STAR is a horrible method that is very
> highly
> > vulnerable to both Compromise and Pushover.
> >
> > I welcome any comments you may have have about my poll favourite,
> > Approval Sorted Margins. Or anything else related to my most
> recent ballot.
> >
> > Chris
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