[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Chris Benham]

Richard,

I have a few questions and comments on your ballot with accompanying 
remarks.

I have trouble understanding the motivation behind "RCIPE".   It seems 
to me that it must
elect the Condorcet winner unless, initially or after one or more 
eliminations, there is a bottom
cycle (and thus no Condorcet Loser) in which case it is possible that 
the Condorcet winner will
have the fewest top-choice votes and be eliminated.

And that is why it fails Clone-Loser, because the candidates in the 
bottom cycle cycle could be a
set of clones and if they were replaced with a single candidate then 
there would be a Condorcet
loser who would be eliminated instead of possibly the Condorcet winner.

I find this all very odd, and I'm not sure what you are"buying" in 
comparison with plain Hare (aka IRV).

Unlike RCIPE, it meets Clone Independence and Later-no-Help and 
Later-no-Harm and already meets
Condorcet Loser.  So you are trashing quite a bit just to get a bit more 
"Condorcet efficiency".

Why do you think that RP(wv) and Schulze are significantly different 
from each other?  There needs
to be more than 3 candidates in the top cycle (aka Smith set) for them 
to give different winners and
I gather that even in that very rare circumstance they usually give the 
same winner.

And why do you think that MinMax(wv) is better than either? Doesn't it 
fail Smith and Clone Independence?

Why do you think Woodall is better than Benham?

What is the (or your) definition of "Schwartz-Woodall" ?    And what do 
you think is the positive point of it
compared with plain Woodall?

Chris B.

>
>
> *Richard, the VoteFair guy*electionmethods at votefair.org 
> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%2C%20preliminary%20ballots&In-Reply-To=%3Cbd743764-f4e7-4002-ad13-afe480551977%40votefair.org%3E>
> /Wed Apr 17 17:30:03 PDT 2024/
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Poll ballot from Richard Fobes, the VoteFair guy
>
> Preliminary as of 2024-April-17
>
> Notation:
> "..." indicates a rating gap
> [??] indicates haven't yet seen its description so rank is approximate
>
>
> 1. RCIPE -- [simple, almost Condorcet, almost cloneproof]
> 2. MinMax(wv) -- [best of Condorcet methods]
> 3. RP(wv) -- [doesn't look deep enough into pairwise preferences]
> 4. Woodall --  [good, Smith plus IRV]
> ...
> 5. Schwartz-Woodall -- [Woodall but harder to explain]
> 6. Baldwin -- [Borda version of IRV, requires honesty]
> 7. Copeland//Borda (also called Ranked Robin) -- [simple, requires
> honest voting]
> 8. Black -- [Condorcet else Borda, good but tactical vulnerability]
> 9. Benham -- [same weakness as IRV]
> 10. Schulze -- [complex, increases other IIA failures to get zero clone
> failures]
> 11. Smith//Score -- [requires honesty]
> ...
> 12. Gross Loser Elimination -- [??]
> 13. Max Strength Transitive Beatpath -- [??]
> 14. Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole) -- [??]
> 15. Smith//DAC -- [complexity without significant advantage]
> 16. Double Defeat, Hare -- [??]
> ...
> 17. IRV -- ["overvotes" ignored, lowest count not always least popular,
> correct ballot type]
> 18. Majority Judgement -- [clever, requires honesty, wrong ballot type]
> 19. STAR -- [vulnerable to nomination and voting tactics, dead-end
> ballot type]
> ...
> 20. Approval -- [great for friends, ok for primaries, tactical
> vulnerabilities]
> ...
> 21. Margins-Sorted Approval -- [??]
> 22. Smith//Approval (explicit) -- [complexity without significant advantage]
> 23. Smith//Approval (implicit) -- [cannot rank most-disliked below disliked]
> ...
> 24. Plurality -- [we are here]
> ...
> 25. Approval with manual runoff -- [two choices in "runoff" is too few!!!]
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