[EM] Trying to understand BSTV

Mon Apr 15 00:08:40 PDT 2024

The only reply was in the subject box "Trying to understand BSTV".

If there is anything you want to know, you only have to ask.

To have an answer, there has to be a question.

Regards,

  Richard Lung.

On 05/04/2024 20:37, Richard Lung wrote:
>
>
> Thank you, Filip,
>
> The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one exclusion 
> count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an iteration). For the 
> election count I use Meek method of surplus transfers. The 
> distinction, of that computer count, over the traditional hand counts, 
> is that preferences, for an already elected candidate, with a quota, 
> are still recorded. Meek did that by updating the candidate keep value 
> (the quota divided by a candidates total transferable vote).
>
> Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate, losers as 
> well as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have keep values of 
> more than unity, signifying they are excluded. The exclusion count is 
> run exactly like the election count but with the preferences reversed, 
> so a quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an 
> election count elects candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion 
> count excludes candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is 
> another voters unpreferences. There is no difference in principle 
> between them.
>
> Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV would be 
> STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding forms of STV, 
> including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper looks just like any 
> Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are different. Every voting 
> method has voters instructions.
>
> The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are four 
> seats available and ten candidates to choose from. Your first four 
> preferences would more or less help to elect candidates. Your next 6 
> preferences (if you choose to make them) would less or more help to 
> exclude those candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as much 
> against a candidate, as your first preference would count for a 
> candidate. But you don't have to give any order of preference. A carte 
> blanche is equivalent to NOTA. If a quota of abstentions is reached, 
> one of the seats is left empty. This election also gives voters the 
> rational power to exclude candidates.
>
> Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to gain both 
> election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive" and "dead" to the 
> electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers candidate" according to Forest 
> Simmons.) Whether they are elected or excluded is determined by a 
> Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by the election quota. If the 
> ratio is one or less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The 
> Quotient is the square of a geometric mean.)
>
> When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion election. 
> The geometric means of the candidates election keep values and inverse 
> exclusion keep value establish the over-all order of popularity of the 
> candidates (from lowest to highest over-all keep values.
>
> All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish whether 
> they care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also means there 
> is no reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in Meek method. 
> Counting abstentions observes the conservation of (preferential) 
> information.
>
> I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which, unlike the 
> higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek method, and simpler in 
> conception than the hand counts. However I have always supported them 
> all my adult life, and am now an old man.
>
> Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding, which he 
> sent me:
>
> https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master
>
> The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters:
>
> https://votingstv.cloud/
>
> And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a 
> technical person, unlike myself.
>
> Regards,
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
>
>
> On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak wrote:
>> This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to 
>> understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do 
>> Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV 
>> contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 
>> 6 losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff 
>> they have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, 
>> isn't it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not 
>> right, what's the actual algorithm?
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     “I DO object to STV’s negative response”
>>
>>      It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else
>>     objects to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century
>>     ago (The Elements of Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a
>>     matter of opinion, but a matter of demonstration.
>>
>>     It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional
>>     counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor
>>     methods. Originally STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is
>>     merely the minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I
>>     have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean quota, V/(S+1/2)
>>     which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte Lague
>>     divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned
>>     out to have that extra confirmation.
>>
>>     As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order)
>>     Binomial STV and supplied the list with some links, including to
>>     GitHub. The other day I learned that GitHub suffered a mass
>>     malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe did not completely
>>     recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it
>>     being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not
>>     received the links.
>>
>>     First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than
>>     conventional STV. It is a one-truth election method, which makes
>>     it unique, not only to STV but to all the worlds election
>>     methods, which are at least two-truth methods. That is to say,
>>     they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their rules
>>     differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle,
>>     election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election
>>     is another voters exclusion
>>
>>     Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for
>>     electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it is
>>     symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First order STV
>>     involves two counts, an election count of preferences and an
>>     exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use Meek
>>     method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
>>     procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an
>>     election quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota).
>>     The exclusion count is an iteration of the election count.
>>
>>     However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it
>>     dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when
>>     election surpluses run out. It also dispenses with the Meek
>>     method policy of reducing the quota as voters abstain their
>>     preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information is counted,
>>     thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of
>>     (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised
>>     knowledge.
>>
>>     Regards,
>>
>>     Richard Lung.
>>
>>
>>
>>     On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>     My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of
>>>     the reply. So let me resume:
>>>
>>>     As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
>>>     Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV
>>>     is a humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new
>>>     balloting equipment & software…while list-PR requires no new
>>>     balloting equipment & no software modification. The allocations
>>>     to parties & their candidates can be determined at any kitchen
>>>     table where there’s a hand-calculator.
>>>
>>>     To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:
>>>
>>>     It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise,
>>>     & it would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes
>>>     with Hare,  which always chooses the favorite of the largest
>>>     faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is once.
>>>
>>>     But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived
>>>     lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the
>>>     CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting
>>>     is insisted-on.
>>>
>>>     … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly
>>>     offered.  It currently is not.
>>>
>>>     There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to
>>>     reply to, if I can find it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>     ----
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>>
>
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