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<p>The only reply was in the subject box "Trying to understand
BSTV". <br>
</p>
<p>If there is anything you want to know, you only have to ask.</p>
<p>To have an answer, there has to be a question.<br>
</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p> Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05/04/2024 20:37, Richard Lung
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:59959315-7cd8-4dc2-92e6-963a3a9378a1@ukscientists.com">
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<p>Thank you, Filip,</p>
<p>The first order Binomial STV is one election count and one
exclusion count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an
iteration). For the election count I use Meek method of surplus
transfers. The distinction, of that computer count, over the
traditional hand counts, is that preferences, for an already
elected candidate, with a quota, are still recorded. Meek did
that by updating the candidate keep value (the quota divided by
a candidates total transferable vote).</p>
<p>Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for every candidate,
losers as well as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota have
keep values of more than unity, signifying they are excluded.
The exclusion count is run exactly like the election count but
with the preferences reversed, so a quota now becomes an
exclusion quota. The rule is simple: an election count elects
candidates reaching the quota. An exclusion count excludes
candidates reaching a quota. One voters preferences is another
voters unpreferences. There is no difference in principle
between them.</p>
<p>Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order Binomial STV
would be STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n. Preceding
forms of STV, including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot paper
looks just like any Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are
different. Every voting method has voters instructions. <br>
</p>
<p>The instructions are, in the case of your example: There are
four seats available and ten candidates to choose from. Your
first four preferences would more or less help to elect
candidates. Your next 6 preferences (if you choose to make them)
would less or more help to exclude those candidates. So, a tenth
preference counts as much against a candidate, as your first
preference would count for a candidate. But you don't have to
give any order of preference. A carte blanche is equivalent to
NOTA. If a quota of abstentions is reached, one of the seats is
left empty. This election also gives voters the rational power
to exclude candidates.<br>
</p>
<p>Some candidates may be both popular and unpopular enough to
gain both election and exclusion quotas. They are both "alive"
and "dead" to the electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers
candidate" according to Forest Simmons.) Whether they are
elected or excluded is determined by a Quotient of the exclusion
quota divided by the election quota. If the ratio is one or
less, they are elected; if not, excluded. (The Quotient is the
square of a geometric mean.)</p>
<p>When inverted, the exclusion count is like a second-opinion
election. The geometric means of the candidates election keep
values and inverse exclusion keep value establish the over-all
order of popularity of the candidates (from lowest to highest
over-all keep values.<br>
</p>
<p>All the voters abstentions have to be counted, to establish
whether they care more to elect or exclude candidates. This also
means there is no reduction of the quota with abstentions, as in
Meek method. Counting abstentions observes the conservation of
(preferential) information.</p>
<p>I hired a programmer for first order Binomial STV, which,
unlike the higher orders, should be much simpler than Meek
method, and simpler in conception than the hand counts. However
I have always supported them all my adult life, and am now an
old man.</p>
<p>Kristofer found the GitHub link to the programmers coding,
which he sent me:</p>
<p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master</a></p>
<p>The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for the use of voters:</p>
<p><a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://votingstv.cloud/" moz-do-not-send="true">https://votingstv.cloud/</a></p>
<p>And he sent me two manuals, which I attach, in case useful to a
technical person, unlike myself.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05/04/2024 16:26, Filip Ejlak
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAGsbvGwPnV7AG3DnGU9eFV26VrXDxX3WQS3tNoYQAHYLQ6emNg@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="ltr">
<div>This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am
trying to understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it).
If we want to do Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4
seats, do we just do an STV contest for 4 winners with a
simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 losers, with a
candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff they have
won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, isn't
it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's
not right, what's the actual algorithm?</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
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<div dir="ltr"><br>
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<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Richard Lung <<a
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">voting@ukscientists.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p><br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">“I
DO object to STV’s negative response”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> It
does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or
anyone else objects to an election method. As HG
Wells said over a century ago (The Elements of
Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter
of opinion, but a matter of demonstration.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">It
is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent
proportional counts to Webster/Sainte Lague and the
d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally STV used
the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the
minimum PR, as the Hare quota is the maximum PR. I
have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean
quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for
proportionality to the Sainte Lague divisor rule.
But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned
out to have that extra confirmation.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">As
a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first
order) Binomial STV and supplied the list with some
links, including to GitHub. The other day I learned
that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023,
from which they maybe did not completely recover. I
have no technical knowledge myself. So I welcome it
being looked into by admin, but that is why the list
has not received the links.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">First
order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than
conventional STV. It is a one-truth election method,
which makes it unique, not only to STV but to all
the worlds election methods, which are at least
two-truth methods. That is to say, they are
“unscientific” or inconsistent, because their rules
differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates.
In principle, election and exclusion are the same,
because one voters election is another voters
exclusion<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Binomial
STV (not only first order) uses the same method for
electing as excluding candidates. In other words, it
is symmetrical as to election and exclusion. First
order STV involves two counts, an election count of
preferences and an exclusion count of reversed
preferences. Both counts use Meek method computer
count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude
them (to an election quota or an exclusion quota,
otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count is an
iteration of the election count.<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">However,
first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that
it dispenses with its “last past the post” exclusion
method, when election surpluses run out. It also
dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing
the quota as voters abstain their preferences. On
the contrary, abstentions information is counted,
thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of
(preferential) information, fundamental to science
or organised knowledge.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Regards,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Richard
Lung.</span></p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div>On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> My phone fell off its stand,
resulting in premature sending of the reply. So let me
resume:
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s
negative response, because Sainte-Lague &
d’Hondt don’t have any negative response. …&
STV is a humongously elaborate complex procedure,
requiring new balloting equipment &
software…while list-PR requires no new balloting
equipment & no software modification. The
allocations to parties & their candidates can be
determined at any kitchen table where there’s a
hand-calculator.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">To return to the matter of Hare
single-winner:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s true that sometimes the CW is an
unliked middle compromise, & it would be better
to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with
Hare, which always chooses the favorite of the
largest faction of the Mutual-Majority when there is
once.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But, to best & always & most
reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil
giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the
CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv) when
rank-balloting is insisted-on.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">… but would support a Hare proposal if
Hare is honestly offered. It currently is not.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">There might be other comments in that
post that I’d like to reply to, if I can find it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
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