[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Wait, 45% of the ballots in this election violate the
strictly-single-peaked assumption. Center seems to be just as
polarizing/hated as Left and Right. Under these ballots, "center" isn't a
centrist candidate, he's some kind of third position. (Maybe you could get
this result if you had a fascist/populist running against extremely
polarized conservatives and liberals? You need some kind of circular
ideological spectrum for this election to happen with sincere ballots.)

So I have no intuition for who should win, because this isn't a
single-dimensional election. If the ballots are perfectly honest, your
"Right" candidate should win because he's the optimal-utility candidate.
The single-peaked preference assumption is violated too badly for Condorcet
to be a good guide here.

On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 8:43 AM robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

> On 04/13/2024 10:57 AM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > If it's incredibly close, vote honestly.
> >
> >
>
> But that doesn't necessarily serve my political interests.  Again, this
> example demonstrates that:
>
> 3 candidates:
>
>   L => Left candidate
>   C => Center candidate
>   R => Right candidate
>
> 100 voters:
>
>    - 34 Left voters:
>    --- 23 ballots: L:5 C:1 R:0
>    ---  4 ballots: L:5 C:0 R:1
>    ---  7 ballots: L:5 C:0 R:0
>
>    - 29 Center voters:
>    --- 15 ballots: L:1 C:5 R:0
>    ---  9 ballots: L:0 C:5 R:1
>    ---  5 ballots: L:0 C:5 R:0
>
>    - 37 Right voters:
>    --- 17 ballots: L:0 C:1 R:5
>    ---  5 ballots: L:1 C:0 R:5
>    --- 15 ballots: L:0 C:0 R:5
>
> Score totals:
>
>  Left   = 34x5 + 15 +  5  = 190
>  Center = 29x5 + 23 + 17  = 185
>  Right  = 37x5 +  9 +  4  = 198
>
> With Score or FPTP, Right wins.
> With STAR or IRV, Left wins.
> With Condorcet, Center wins.
>
> What should the Center voters do to best realize their political
> interests?  What should the Right voters, who liked Center better than
> Left, do to best realize their political interests?
>
> And, again, how do I know, in advance, whether my favorite candidate is a
> front runner or not?
>
> Lastly, how is this STAR thing *not* tactical voting?  If I vote
> non-tactically, I might just be screwing myself as demonstrated above.
>
> r b-j
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 12:02 PM robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > >
> > > > My goodness, I certainly disagree with that.
> > > >
> > > > How high do I score my second-favorite candidate (or my lesser-evil
> candidate)?
> > > You max-score them if your favorite isn't one of the frontrunners.
> > >
> > How will I know that, in a close 3-way race?
> >
> > Why would I want to throw away my vote for my fav by equal-scoring my
> lesser-evil to my fav?
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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