[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Toby Pereira]

 Chris
Primarily, the scores are there to determine the ranks and therefore the Condorcet winner, or the Smith Set if there's no Condorcet winner. The reason for scores is what I've said previously - I think it works as protection against burial, and also I think with a large number of candidates it's easier for the voter. With rankings, they really have to write in the ranks in numerical order, and if they accidentally miss someone out, it can mess up the whole ordering. Scores can be done in any order as long they have a general idea of the best and worst candidates.
I don't think your suggestion is too bad in theory, but it might be a bit opaque to most voters. So I'm not saying I dislike it.
Yes, based on how people approve, some will have more influence in the approval run-off under what I proposed. This would also be the same as for your proposal with double the number of ratings slots, as I understand it. There is also some merit in allowing voters to choose who they approve, even if there are some drawbacks.
Toby
    On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 16:22:10 BST, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:  
 
  
Toby,
 
 

Voters could even enter the score that every candidate scoring that score or above counts as approved. 
 
 If the scores are only used to imply ratings, with the voters manually entering their approval cutoffs, then what is the point of them versus simple ranking??
 
 My suggestion perfectly simulates the voters using rational zero-info approval strategy among the Smith set candidates.  What is wrong with that?
 
 With the approvals manually entered and fixed as you suggest, you are doing nothing to address the unfairness of voters who happen to make some approval
 distinction among the candidates who make it into the Smith set having more influence on the result than those that don't.
 
 One crude and simple solution is to have a grading or score ballot with enough slots to accommodate twice the number of candidates, and the top half of them
 are labelled "Approved" and the bottom half labelled "Not Approved" and the scores given interpreted accordingly.
 
These ballots could be used for Smith//Approval or Margins Sorted Approval.
 
 Another idea that has been suggested it to have the approval cutoff represented by a virtual candidate on a ranked ballot. Ballots are interpreting as approving
 the candidates they rank above this "candidate".  I don't mind that.
 
 Chris
 
 
 On 13/04/2024 9:45 pm, Toby Pereira wrote:
  
 
 I was thinking at least 0 to 9, although 0 to 99 would be better in terms of being able to distinguish between all candidates. Most approved among the Smith Set definitely has merit, but it's a question of how you would determine whether a candidate is approved. I'm not sure an above average score seems like the right measure. I think I'd prefer something more explicit. Voters could even enter the score that every candidate scoring that score or above counts as approved. If left blank, maybe highest scored candidates only - I know you seem to have moved in that direction for candidates implicitly approved on ranked ballots. 
  Toby 
      On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 03:13:14 BST, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:  
  
     
Toby,
 
 What range of scores do you have in mind?  Proposals have varied between 0-2 (i.e. 3 rating slots) and 0-99 (100 rating slots).
 
 I think your suggestion has merit as a response to Score fans that boast of Score's  "high Condorcet efficiency".  You are in effect responding:
 
 "Well if that is such a good thing, why not make the method a little bit more complicated and raise that efficiency to 100% ?"
 
 I agree that this much better than SCORE or STAR.   But I don't like deciding  things by just adding up (or averaging) raw Score scores, even just
 within the Smith set, because of the same reason I prefer Approval to Score.  Naive sincere voters are unfairly disadvantaged compared to strategic
 exaggerators.
 
 Here is a variant I very much like but didn't nominate it because I didn't think it was "propose-able" enough in say the US.
 
 *Voters score the candidates on a range large enough to strictly rank all the candidates plus leave several large-ish gaps. Default score is zero.
 Eliminate all the candidates not in the Smith set.
 Interpreting ballots as approving remaining candidates they score above average (of the scores they give to remaining candidates), elect
 the most approved member of the Smith set*.
 
 So this is like a "Declared Strategy" method that simulates: first use rankings to identify the members of the Smith set and then hold an Approval
 election among those candidates.
 
 What do you think?  
 
 Chris
 
 
  On 13/04/2024 12:49 am, Toby Pereira wrote:
  
 
      I will mention why I nominated Smith//Score. This method uses rated ballots, but uses them to infer a ranking. If there is a Condorcet winner, they are elected. Otherwise, elect the score winner of the Smith Set (the top cycle). I previously put why I think rated ballots work well for Condorcet (see below). And given a rated ballot, electing the highest scored candidate given no Condorcet winner seems the most simple and logical option, and shouldn't damage independence of clones or monotonicity. It also sidesteps any worry/complications over whether margins/winning votes etc. are the best thing to look at. 
  Toby 
  
    >I think one problem of burial-resistant methods is that they assume the electorate are aware of the consequences of it and will act accordingly. I think it might be a bit optimistic to expect the average voter to behave any differently using any method that uses a specific ballot type. Using a ranked ballot, if A and B are the frontrunning candidates, then supporters of A might rank B bottom because it's the obvious thing to do (which has been pointed out on here before I believe). Do you think the adoption of a specific Condorcet method will prevent that? I'm not convinced. 
  >Also, if there are two frontrunning candidates, A and B, it's quite likely anyway that supporters of A will see B as the worst candidate anyway, below the ones they know very little about. So it wouldn't really even be an act of burial, and therefore honest voting behaviour could cause a non-entity to win, because this is what burial-resistant methods do. 
  >I've said this before, but possibly the best solution for a Condorcet method would to be to use rated ballots. In this case B is less likely to be buried by the A supporters, because they would be likely to score the non-entity candidates 0 as well.  
  
      On Thursday, 11 April 2024 at 08:37:54 BST, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:  
  
    
  
  On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:45 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
  

 Have the nominations closed?   
 
  Yes, at 5:14:59 GMT, April 12th. 
  
  
Not that I want to nominate another method.
 
 There has been very little electioneering, with I think most of the 
 nominated methods not even being mentioned.
 
 
  Yes, we weren’t given any information on most of the nominees. People should have told the advantages/merits of their nominees. 

 Some haven't even been explained let alone discussed or promoted.
 
  Exactly. That’s why I ranked most of them all together at the same rank-position. The ones I know about & like ranked in order of merit, then the ones that I don’t know equal-ranked, & then, below them, the ones I know that I don’t like. Pluraity was at bottom, as everyone agrees, & so there was no reason to rank it. 

 
               
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240413/78fec965/attachment-0001.htm>