[EM] Condorcet methods and Hare versus Median Ratings methods like Majority Judgement and Bucklin

[Closed Limelike Curves]

This is probably true under much weaker conditions. It feels like every
good (FBC, monotone?) method converges to approval with strategic voters.
(And approval converges to Smith//Approval.)

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 9:21 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-04-10 15:36, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> > But there is a very strong incentive for voters to just submit approval
> > ballots, and in a competitive election with
> > informed voters the extra complexity versus simple Approval doesn't seem
> > to buy much.
>
> I think there's a more general result:
>
> Say we have a method that elects the candidate with the highest quality,
> and the quality of a candidate A only depends on each ballot's
> information about A (not on A's position relative to any other B).
> Suppose that the quality function f(A) is weakly monotone in the sense
> that if a voter raises (lowers) A, then f(A) can never decrease (increase).
>
> Then with complete information, Approval strategy is optimal.
>
> This covers both Range and MJ, and the most obvious way to make a
> general cardinal method pass IIA.
>
> -km
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