[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections
Michael Garman
michael.garman at rankthevote.us
Fri Apr 12 10:40:41 PDT 2024
Agreed. If the purpose of this is to inform the public, we’ve also lost the
plot — how many of these methods have a chance of being widely understood,
let alone implemented, anywhere outside this bubble?
On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 7:38 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
> This seems like far more methods than anyone could rank, and all of them
> are starting to blend together for me. I think we're just splitting Hares
> at this point.
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-11 23:52, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
>> > I suggest creating a list of links to the associated Wikipedia or
>> > Electowiki articles, one for each method. One person supplying all the
>> > links will save time for the rest of us. Personally I'm going to need
>> > to read about some of these methods.
>>
>> Good idea. Here are some links and brief descriptions. I've tried to be
>> neutral; I may post later with my thoughts about the methods, and what
>> notable criteria they pass and fail that I know of.
>>
>> I've only done the methods that have a wiki page. At the bottom is a
>> list of those methods that don't. Their proposers have already described
>> them, but they might need a more clear description; in any case, I'll
>> leave that to them :-)
>>
>> Smith//Score:
>> This is a composite method.
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
>> It takes rated ballots.
>> It first eliminates every candidate not in the Smith set, and
>> then does
>> Range voting (Score voting) on the remaining candidates. No
>> normalization is done after the elimination, so a vote A: 10, B: 7, C: 0
>> still gives B 7 points and C 0 even if A isn't in the Smith set.
>> In Daniel Carrera's words: "The ballot would look like a Score
>> ballot.
>> To process the ballots, the scores are converted into rankings (equal
>> rankings allowed), and the highest scoring candidate inside the Smith
>> set is elected." See also Toby's last post.
>>
>> Approval with manual runoff:
>> First do a round of Approval voting. Determine the top two
>> candidates,
>> then hold a later second round to determine who of the two wins. This is
>> like STAR, but spacing the rounds apart makes it possible to hold
>> debates, discuss the differences between the finalists, and so on. On
>> the other hand, it's more expensive.
>>
>> Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff):
>> This is a composite method. It takes a ranked ballot with an
>> approval
>> cutoff marked.
>> Every voter approves of (gives a point to) every candidate ranked
>> above
>> his approval cutoff. The Smith set member with the most points wins.
>>
>> Smith//Approval (implicit):
>> Like Smith//Approval, except the voter can't specify an approval
>> cutoff. Instead, every candidate ranked is counted as approved, and
>> every candidate not ranked as not approved. The intent is to deter burial.
>>
>> Woodall:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method
>> This method takes ranked ballots. First make a note of the
>> initial
>> Smith set. Then keep doing IRV until only one candidate of the initial
>> Smith set remains. Elect that candidate. Note: This is not Benham - the
>> initial Smith set never changes.
>>
>> Schwartz-Woodall:
>> The same as Woodall, but with the Schwartz set. The Schwartz set
>> is
>> slightly less prone to ties.
>>
>> Copeland//Borda:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin
>> This method takes ranked ballots.
>> First eliminate every candidate not in the Copeland set. Then
>> calculate
>> the Borda scores of the remaining candidates and elect its winner. This
>> can be done by using the Condorcet matrix alone.
>>
>> Minmax(wv):
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method
>> This method takes ranked ballots.
>> Based on the ballots, consider each one-on-one matchups between
>> candidates. Elect the candidate who has the most comfortable lead
>> against the candidate who does best against him, one on one.
>>
>> Plurality:
>> You know this one. Choose-one ballots, equal rank not allowed,
>> most
>> first preferences wins.
>>
>> Majority Judgement (category):
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment
>> Various tiebreakers exist, e.g.
>>
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures
>>
>> This takes graded ballots. The candidates give each candidate a
>> grade,
>> usually one of Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject.
>> For each candidate, calculate the highest grade so that a majority gives
>> that candidate at least that grade. The candidate with the highest such
>> majority grade wins.
>> The method is often indecisive, which means a tiebreaker has to
>> be
>> used. There are many, but they all try to preserve the dynamics of MJ.
>>
>> IRV:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
>> This should also be familiar to everybody here. It takes ranked
>> ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality loser until a candidate
>> obtains a majority of the non-exhausted first preferences.
>>
>> STAR:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
>> This takes rated ballots. The ballot typically has six ratings
>> (zero to
>> five inclusive), but the method could work with any number. The method
>> counts the total number of points for each candidate. The pairwise
>> winner of the two candidates with the most points wins.
>>
>> Schulze:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method
>> This takes ranked ballots. The method is complex but basically
>> amounts
>> to a cloneproof Smith generalization of Minmax.
>> Let a beatpath from a candidate A to another candidate Z be a
>> series of
>> pairwise defeats A beats B beats C beats... beats Y beats Z. The
>> strength of the path is measured by the strength of its weakest
>> individual pairwise contest. Let "the" beatpath from A to Z be the
>> beatpath of strongest strength.
>> The Schulze winner is the candidate whose beatpath to anybody
>> else is
>> at least as strong as their beatpath back to him.
>>
>> Baldwin:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method
>> This takes ranked ballots.
>> Baldwin is the Borda analog of IRV. In each round, the candidate
>> with
>> the lowest Borda count is eliminated. The last man standing wins. Also
>> called Total Vote Runoff by Foley and Maskin.
>>
>> Black:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method
>> This takes ranked ballots.
>> If there is a Condorcet winner, elect that CW. Otherwise elect
>> the
>> Borda winner.
>>
>> Approval:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting
>> This takes an Approval ballot: vote for one or more. The
>> candidate with
>> the most marks wins.
>>
>> Benham:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method
>> This method takes ranked ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the
>> Plurality
>> loser until there's a Condorcet winner among the remaining candidates.
>> Elect the Condorcet winner when that happens.
>>
>> Smith//DAC:
>> This is a composite method.
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions
>> It takes ranked ballots.
>> First eliminate every candidate not in the Smith set. Then
>> perform the
>> DAC algorithm to determine the winner.
>> The DAC algorithm is complex, with the result being a cloneproof
>> method
>> otherwise close to Plurality.
>> Essentially, the DAC algorithm works like this: For each ballot,
>> for
>> each set of candidates a voter acquiesces to, increase that set's count
>> by one. Then sort the sets in order of count, descending. Starting at
>> the top with the current viable set being every candidate, eliminate
>> from the viable set every candidate who is not in the set at the list's
>> current position, unless that would eliminate everybody. The candidate/s
>> remaining once you've traversed the whole list is/are the winner/s.
>> A voter acquiesces to a set if he doesn't rank any candidate
>> outside
>> the set strictly above a candidate within the set.
>>
>> RCIPE:
>>
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination
>> This takes ranked ballots.
>> Modify IRV to, instead of eliminating the Plurality loser,
>> eliminate
>> the current Condorcet loser among the remaining (uneliminated)
>> candidates. Only eliminate the Plurality loser if there is no Plurality
>> loser. Once a candidate has a majority of the non-exhausted first
>> preference votes, elect that candidate.
>>
>> RP(wv):
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs
>> This takes ranked ballots.
>> First count the pairwise matrix. Create a sorted list of every
>> pairwise
>> victory, sorted by its strength. Break ties by random ballot.
>> Proceed from the top down the list, locking in a pairwise
>> relation
>> unless it would create a cycle.
>> At the end, the locked-in contests give an order of candidates.
>> This is
>> the election order: the candidate on top is the winner.
>> Strictly speaking, the tiebreaking is by random voter hierarchy,
>> but
>> I've skipped the details about how that is constructed.
>>
>> I think that should be correct, but if I forgot something or described
>> them incorrectly, let me know.
>>
>> The methods not described are:
>> Margins-Sorted Approval
>> Double Defeat, Hare
>> Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
>> Gross Loser Elimination
>> Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
>>
>> -km
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>>
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