[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Closed Limelike Curves]

This seems like far more methods than anyone could rank, and all of them
are starting to blend together for me. I think we're just splitting Hares
at this point.

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-04-11 23:52, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> > I suggest creating a list of links to the associated Wikipedia or
> > Electowiki articles, one for each method.  One person supplying all the
> > links will save time for the rest of us.  Personally I'm going to need
> > to read about some of these methods.
>
> Good idea. Here are some links and brief descriptions. I've tried to be
> neutral; I may post later with my thoughts about the methods, and what
> notable criteria they pass and fail that I know of.
>
> I've only done the methods that have a wiki page. At the bottom is a
> list of those methods that don't. Their proposers have already described
> them, but they might need a more clear description; in any case, I'll
> leave that to them :-)
>
> Smith//Score:
>         This is a composite method.
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
>         It takes rated ballots.
>         It first eliminates every candidate not in the Smith set, and then
> does
> Range voting (Score voting) on the remaining candidates. No
> normalization is done after the elimination, so a vote A: 10, B: 7, C: 0
> still gives B 7 points and C 0 even if A isn't in the Smith set.
>         In Daniel Carrera's words: "The ballot would look like a Score
> ballot.
> To process the ballots, the scores are converted into rankings (equal
> rankings allowed), and the highest scoring candidate inside the Smith
> set is elected." See also Toby's last post.
>
> Approval with manual runoff:
>         First do a round of Approval voting. Determine the top two
> candidates,
> then hold a later second round to determine who of the two wins. This is
> like STAR, but spacing the rounds apart makes it possible to hold
> debates, discuss the differences between the finalists, and so on. On
> the other hand, it's more expensive.
>
> Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff):
>         This is a composite method. It takes a ranked ballot with an
> approval
> cutoff marked.
>         Every voter approves of (gives a point to) every candidate ranked
> above
> his approval cutoff. The Smith set member with the most points wins.
>
> Smith//Approval (implicit):
>         Like Smith//Approval, except the voter can't specify an approval
> cutoff. Instead, every candidate ranked is counted as approved, and
> every candidate not ranked as not approved. The intent is to deter burial.
>
> Woodall:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method
>         This method takes ranked ballots. First make a note of the initial
> Smith set. Then keep doing IRV until only one candidate of the initial
> Smith set remains. Elect that candidate. Note: This is not Benham - the
> initial Smith set never changes.
>
> Schwartz-Woodall:
>         The same as Woodall, but with the Schwartz set. The Schwartz set
> is
> slightly less prone to ties.
>
> Copeland//Borda:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin
>         This method takes ranked ballots.
>         First eliminate every candidate not in the Copeland set. Then
> calculate
> the Borda scores of the remaining candidates and elect its winner. This
> can be done by using the Condorcet matrix alone.
>
> Minmax(wv):
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method
>         This method takes ranked ballots.
>         Based on the ballots, consider each one-on-one matchups between
> candidates. Elect the candidate who has the most comfortable lead
> against the candidate who does best against him, one on one.
>
> Plurality:
>         You know this one. Choose-one ballots, equal rank not allowed,
> most
> first preferences wins.
>
> Majority Judgement (category):
>         https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment
>         Various tiebreakers exist, e.g.
>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures
>
>         This takes graded ballots. The candidates give each candidate a
> grade,
> usually one of Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject.
> For each candidate, calculate the highest grade so that a majority gives
> that candidate at least that grade. The candidate with the highest such
> majority grade wins.
>         The method is often indecisive, which means a tiebreaker has to be
> used. There are many, but they all try to preserve the dynamics of MJ.
>
> IRV:
>         https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
>         This should also be familiar to everybody here. It takes ranked
> ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality loser until a candidate
> obtains a majority of the non-exhausted first preferences.
>
> STAR:
>         https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting
>         This takes rated ballots. The ballot typically has six ratings
> (zero to
> five inclusive), but the method could work with any number. The method
> counts the total number of points for each candidate. The pairwise
> winner of the two candidates with the most points wins.
>
> Schulze:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method
>         This takes ranked ballots. The method is complex but basically
> amounts
> to a cloneproof Smith generalization of Minmax.
>         Let a beatpath from a candidate A to another candidate Z be a
> series of
> pairwise defeats A beats B beats C beats... beats Y beats Z. The
> strength of the path is measured by the strength of its weakest
> individual pairwise contest. Let "the" beatpath from A to Z be the
> beatpath of strongest strength.
>         The Schulze winner is the candidate whose beatpath to anybody else
> is
> at least as strong as their beatpath back to him.
>
> Baldwin:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method
>         This takes ranked ballots.
>         Baldwin is the Borda analog of IRV. In each round, the candidate
> with
> the lowest Borda count is eliminated. The last man standing wins. Also
> called Total Vote Runoff by Foley and Maskin.
>
> Black:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method
>         This takes ranked ballots.
>         If there is a Condorcet winner, elect that CW. Otherwise elect the
> Borda winner.
>
> Approval:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting
>         This takes an Approval ballot: vote for one or more. The candidate
> with
> the most marks wins.
>
> Benham:
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method
>         This method takes ranked ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the
> Plurality
> loser until there's a Condorcet winner among the remaining candidates.
> Elect the Condorcet winner when that happens.
>
> Smith//DAC:
>         This is a composite method.
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions
>         It takes ranked ballots.
>         First eliminate every candidate not in the Smith set. Then perform
> the
> DAC algorithm to determine the winner.
>         The DAC algorithm is complex, with the result being a cloneproof
> method
> otherwise close to Plurality.
>          Essentially, the DAC algorithm works like this: For each ballot,
> for
> each set of candidates a voter acquiesces to, increase that set's count
> by one. Then sort the sets in order of count, descending. Starting at
> the top with the current viable set being every candidate, eliminate
> from the viable set every candidate who is not in the set at the list's
> current position, unless that would eliminate everybody. The candidate/s
> remaining once you've traversed the whole list is/are the winner/s.
>         A voter acquiesces to a set if he doesn't rank any candidate
> outside
> the set strictly above a candidate within the set.
>
> RCIPE:
>
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination
>         This takes ranked ballots.
>         Modify IRV to, instead of eliminating the Plurality loser,
> eliminate
> the current Condorcet loser among the remaining (uneliminated)
> candidates. Only eliminate the Plurality loser if there is no Plurality
> loser. Once a candidate has a majority of the non-exhausted first
> preference votes, elect that candidate.
>
> RP(wv):
>         https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs
>         This takes ranked ballots.
>         First count the pairwise matrix. Create a sorted list of every
> pairwise
> victory, sorted by its strength. Break ties by random ballot.
>         Proceed from the top down the list, locking in a pairwise relation
> unless it would create a cycle.
>         At the end, the locked-in contests give an order of candidates.
> This is
> the election order: the candidate on top is the winner.
>         Strictly speaking, the tiebreaking is by random voter hierarchy,
> but
> I've skipped the details about how that is constructed.
>
> I think that should be correct, but if I forgot something or described
> them incorrectly, let me know.
>
> The methods not described are:
>         Margins-Sorted Approval
>         Double Defeat, Hare
>         Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
>         Gross Loser Elimination
>         Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
>
> -km
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