[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Thu Apr 11 02:44:41 PDT 2024

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:43 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> >> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
> finishes LAST. Every time.  The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
> top of the finishing order.
>
> Because the population taking a STAR or Condorcet internet poll is in no
> way representative of the overall electorate, much as I’d like for those
> findings to be true.
>

Ah yes, it’s always those other people :-)

Greens & Bernie nearly always CW.  Republicans consistently, always,
finishing at the  very bottom. That would take a lot of sampling bias.

> >> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky &
> many other expert commentators looked at.
>
> I must be! In every poll I’ve seen for this cycle, third party candidates
> (other than the lunatic Kennedy Jr) don’t even crack double digits! Care to
> provide the polls you’re talking about?
>

I’ve never, ever, been asked or invited to vote in a mass-media poll that
allowed a Green as a choice. …& nearly all mass media polls ask whom you’d
vote for it were today.

The only polls that ask me whom I like more are when the Democrats ask
which of   Biden or Trump I prefer.

I’ve never received any that mention Jill.

You’re probably referring to vote %. Right, because you’re going to vote
for Joe. ..& then say it means something when Greens get few votes.  :-)

> >> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the
> Republocrats allow. …& more & different parties.
>
> Agreed! Like you, I want a leftist party. That doesn’t mean one has any
> chance of winning the 2024 election.
>

…  because you’re voting for Biden.

> >> Check the Harpers issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about
> count-fraud.
>
> The alleged fraud would have tipped the election from R to D
>

How very odd, then, that it was reported as doing the opposite :-) Harpers
reported mountains of evidence of large-scale count-fraud in Bush’s favor.

>
You mention Nader. He pointed that  the  vote isn’t split by the honest
voters. It’s split by the dishonest voters who hold their noses & vote for
someone they don’t like or want.

which I suspect you’d argue wouldn’t make any difference if you subscribe
> to the notion that the two major parties are the same. It didn’t cost Ralph
> Nader the presidency!
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:00 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>> I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
>>> think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
>>> this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
>>> support this conclusion.
>>>
>>
>> You must be looking at different polls from the ones Noam Chomsky & many
> other expert commentators looked at.
>
> Consistently, in every Condorcet or STAR Internet poll, the Republican
>> finishes LAST. Every time.  The Green or Bernie is usually the CW, at the
>> top of the finishing order.
>>
>> Sure when election like the upcoming on approaches people start topvoting
>> Biden, & he starts topping the finishing-order. But guess what: The
>> Republican remains at BOTTOM.
>>
>> Polls always indicate that people want better than what the Republocrats
>> allow. …& more & different parties.
>>
>> Polls in the mass-media never ask people to choose between Democrat &
>> Green. …or their policies.  Everything your TV spoonfeeds you is about
>> Democrats & Republicans.. with the implication that they’re all there is.
>> That’s true of NPR too.
>>
>> The two  choices. Bullshit.
>>
>> Yes, the Republicrats are the only ones who have a chance of winning the
>> upcoming election…if that’s all you vote for.  :-)
>>
>> Neither evil (lesser nor greater) is liked. So why the hell is everyone
>> voting for one of them??
>>
>> When you’re told that two odious & unliked liars are the two
>> choices…what’s wrong with this picture??? It’s nonsense.
>>
>> Yes, one of those two will win…because everyone believes that they must
>> vote for them.
>>
>> …sometimes with a little help from count-fraud? Sure. Check the Harpers
>> issue after each Dubya victory, to find out about count-fraud.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
>>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>
>>>>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>>>>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>>>>
>>>> Realism??
>>>>
>>>> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only
>>>> choices??
>>>>
>>>> It’s nonsense. You think  most voters want an an evil?
>>>>
>>>> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
>>>> Republocratic policies.
>>>>
>>>> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
>>>> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>>>>
>>>> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
>>>> shows that people want.
>>>>
>>>> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>> Republican.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> :-D
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
>>>>>>> they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that
>>>>>> out, when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>>>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>>>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another
>>>>>> progressive. But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good
>>>>>> enough. One should *maximally* protect the acceptables.  …often that
>>>>>> requires favorite-burial.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed.
>>>>>> It illustrated  that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW
>>>>>> because you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>>>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>>>>> elections or polls.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes
>>>>>> it effectively a different method.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>>>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>>>>> me_.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sad.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>>>>> candidates too.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>>>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality)
>>>>>>> would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
>>>>>>>> which are not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>>>>> Clone-Winner.  And if there are known front-runners and you insist
>>>>>>>> on voting super-safe then  I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>>>>> candidate you
>>>>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>>>>> nightmare.  Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>>>>> lower.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other
>>>>>>> methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive
>>>>>>> count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
>>>>>>> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll,
>>>>>>> in which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
>>>>>>>> the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
>>>>>>>>> horror of STAR.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff
>>>>>>>> with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
>>>>>>>>> or common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> See above.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
>>>>>>>>> Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
>>>>>>>>> and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>>>>>>>>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
>>>>>>>>> give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much
>>>>>>>>>> more likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
>>>>>>>>>> wonderful.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very
>>>>>>>>>> bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>>>> serious issue
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method
>>>>>>>>>> criterion <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted
>>>>>>>>>> vote <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
>>>>>>>>>> about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>>>> favourite).  If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
>>>>>>>>>> their sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying
>>>>>>>>>> on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
>>>>>>>>>> you might
>>>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
>>>>>>>>>> final.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
>>>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because
>>>>>>>>>> STAR badly fails FBC.
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential
>>>>>>>>>> to empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>>>>    the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>>
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