[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Wed Apr 10 23:29:27 PDT 2024
> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>
> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
> Republican.
That must be a very tight squeeze.
> But Approval favors the voter-median.
That is what I meant.
>
> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
> voter-median, which is Progressive.
I hope you are right.
> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>
> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their vote
other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
candidate will win.
Chris
On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
> candidates too.
>
> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred
> burial with most non wv Condorcet.)
>
> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>
> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>
> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>
> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>
> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>
> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the
> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>
> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
>> & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of
>> some of your acceptables.
>>
> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are
> no known clear front-runners
>
>
>
> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
> work fine.
>
>
> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
> which are not.
>
> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>
>
> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>
> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>
> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
> complex count & its consequences.
>
>
> and benefit from the method's compliance with
> Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
> on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same
> Compromise candidate you
> would in FPP.
>
>
> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>
>
>
> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
> nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare
> is much lower.
>
> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>
> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
> insecurity & vulnerability.
>
> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I
> don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our
> poll, in which I’ve just now voted.
>
> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted
> something even simpler than RP.
>
>
>
> Michael
>
> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham
>> <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> Michael wrote:
>>
>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>
>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>
>> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and
>> Participation. STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>
>>
>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>
>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to
>> the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>
>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying
>> & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of
>> some of your acceptables.
>>
>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
>> horror of STAR.
>>
>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>
>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote
>> their sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>
>>
>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too,
>> I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely
>> reject runoff with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>
>> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>
>>
>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any
>> intelligence or common sense because STAR is obviously
>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>
>>
>> See above.
>>
>>
>>
>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single
>> Non-Transferable Vote with the Single Transferable Vote,
>> keeping compliance
>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser,
>> Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help but losing Participation and
>> Mono-Raise to gain
>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid
>> Coalitions) and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>
>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of
>> properties". It's ok not to like it if you are a
>> fundamentalist about some criterion
>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
>> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way
>> preferable.
>>
>>
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham
>>> <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>> [quote]
>>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my
>>> vote for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>> [/quote]
>>>
>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>
>>> The right use of Score:
>>>
>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>
>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or
>>> not a candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial
>>> approval, by an intermediate point-rating.
>>>
>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way
>>> to give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>
>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>
>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for
>>> themselves with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use
>>> some arbitrary & (somewhat or greatly) complicated
>>> definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense &
>>> count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>
>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while
>>> being more complicated and less fair.
>>>
>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>
>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some
>>> jurisdictions might insist on one.
>>>
>>> …likewise Score.
>>>
>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great
>>> strategy-complication, including the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>
>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>
>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>
>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>> count-fraud security.
>>>
>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>
>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it
>>> meets Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP
>>> the winner
>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be
>>> much more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and
>>> not unrelatedly,
>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
>>> wonderful.
>>>
>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two
>>> Runoff (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make
>>> STAR) is just
>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a
>>> bit more accurate", brings it into compliance with
>>> Condorcet Loser
>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".
>>> ("Sky-high" according to CLC here).
>>>
>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different
>>> and very bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR
>>> must have been
>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>
>>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>>
>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely
>>> useless way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>
>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by
>>> not-so-deep thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>
>>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>>
>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in
>>>> order of preference has been lauded as a solution, but
>>>> in elections where the third candidate is actually
>>>> competitive,vote-splitting remains a serious issue
>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s>and
>>>> RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a
>>>> primary and general election with Choose-One Plurality
>>>> voting.
>>>
>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively
>>>> prevent vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters
>>>> can weigh in on each candidate individually, when all
>>>> ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
>>>> eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass
>>>> theEqual Vote Criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>,
>>>> including STAR Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>
>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion orEquality Criterion
>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote>is avoting method
>>>> criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion>which
>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter
>>>> may cast a vote which is as powerful as a vote cast by
>>>> any other voter. Voting methods which pass the Equal
>>>> Vote Criterion do not exhibitvote-splitting
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting>or the
>>>> "Spoiler Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast
>>>> anequally weighted vote
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and
>>>> Instant Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked
>>>> Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>
>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this
>>> very vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare)
>>> certainly does.
>>>
>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get
>>> negative about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>
>>> 49 Bush
>>> 24 Gore
>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>
>>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>
>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader
>>> voters whose Gore> Bush preference was strong had
>>> incentive to use the Compromise
>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have
>>> approved both Nader and
>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to
>>> vote their sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>
>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than
>>> Hare. The Nader voters would have incentive to give
>>> Nader zero points.
>>>
>>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over
>>> strategy has said to be a result of it's failure of
>>> Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable
>>> to Push-over.
>>>
>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final
>>> two. In that case then you have incentive to give every
>>> candidate that you are sure your
>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are
>>> relying on you favourite winning the runoff without your
>>> help, but if 4 stars then you might
>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into
>>> the final.
>>>
>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists
>>> rely on their favourite winning the runoff against their
>>> own votes, i.e. with their votes supporting
>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much
>>> more risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to
>>> coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>>
>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on
>>> the Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and
>>> misleading, because STAR badly fails FBC.
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>
>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>
>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the
>>>> potential to empower us to be more effective on every
>>>> other issue we care about.
>>>>
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is
>>>> not incentivized.
>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps
>>>> prevent your worst case scenario.
>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many
>>>> candidates/parties are in the race.
>>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to
>>> mean, but I refute the suggestion that these claims are
>>> more true of STAR than they are of Hare.
>>>
>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and
>>> all the Condorcet methods.
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>>
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