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<p><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">Different topic: In a different post, you said
that Approval tend to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but
it isn’t true.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In this country, Centrist are candidates between
the Democrat & the Republican.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
That must be a very tight squeeze.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">But Approval favors the voter-median.</blockquote>
<br>
That is what I meant.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very
long way from the voter-median, which is Progressive.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
I hope you are right.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Because if they do agree with you then
they will all just vote the same set of acceptable candidates
above all the others
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If all progressives had that kind of
information, which candidate to combine on, then VF1 would
work fine.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that
they can vote together above all others, in whatever order they
like.<br>
<br>
And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with
their vote other than just maximising the chance that an
"acceptable"<br>
candidate will win.<br>
<br>
Chris<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAOKDY5DG3qyELFm1b8WU=oJve=4fc+cWr9_gMMvhJjGvCfCO-w@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy
with unacceptable candidates too.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv
Condorcet have it too, if there might be successful burial
(& there might easily be undeterred burial with most non wv
Condorcet.)</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…& the ranked-methods have their completely
prohibitive count-fraud vulnerability problem, due to their
complex count.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Different topic: In a different post, you said
that Approval tend to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but
it isn’t true.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In this country, Centrist are candidates between
the Democrat & the Republican. But Approval favors the
voter-median.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very
long way from the voter-median, which is Progressive.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber
equilibrium is at the voter-median. Approval will soon home-in
on the CW.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at
19:59 Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in
order of winnability. …trying & hoping to match
the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of
your acceptables.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where
there are no known clear front-runners</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1
(Vote-For-1, Plurality) would work fine.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"> </div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto">and the supporters of the candidates you
deem acceptable don't<br>
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable
and which are not.<br>
<br>
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just
vote the same set of acceptable candidates above all the
others </div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If all progressives had that kind of
information, which candidate to combine on, then VF1 would
work fine.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way,
sharing the same problem (admittedly worse in VF1.).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But who wants that problem? …especially when
paying the price of a complex count & its consequences.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto">and benefit from the method's compliance
with<br>
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and
you insist on voting super-safe then I suppose you can
top-rank the same Compromise candidate you<br>
would in FPP.</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy,
in both methods.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the
STAR nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting
sincerely in Hare is much lower.</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto">Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as
do many other methods, including IRV & margins
Condorcet, etc.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’
prohibitive count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I
don’t choose evils, & I don’t propose STAR. But I ranked
it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in which I’ve just
now voted.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a
jurisdiction insisted on one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or
maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something even simpler than
RP.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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<div>
<p dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Michael <br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10,
2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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<div>
<p>Michael wrote:<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than Hare
because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount Score’s
merit.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal
and Participation. STAR trashes those just for
Condorcet Loser. </div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I said “some”, not “all”.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">e.g. If there are unacceptable
candidates, then just give max to the acceptables,
& zero to the unacceptables.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in
order of winnability. …trying & hoping to
match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of
some of your acceptables.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Questionable guesswork. An
intractable strategic morass.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
I could even make up a new criterion just to
encapsulate the horror of STAR.<br>
<br>
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:<br>
<br>
*Voters should never have any strategic
incentive to vote their sincere favourite as low
as possible*.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes,, & isn’t that true with
*any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I don’t like
it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely
reject runoff with Approval. …unless a
jurisdiction insists on it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I much prefer Approval to Score,
for minimalness & unarbitrariness.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
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<div dir="auto"><br>
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone
with any intelligence or common sense because
STAR is obviously<br>
so silly and arbitrary.</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">See above.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single
Non-Transferable Vote with the Single
Transferable Vote, keeping compliance<br>
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser,
Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help but losing
Participation and Mono-Raise to gain <br>
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for
Solid Coalitions) and Dominant Mutual Third and
Clone-Winner.<br>
<br>
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal
set of properties". It's ok not to like it if
you are a fundamentalist about some criterion<br>
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or
FBC) but not to suggest that complete garbage
like STAR is in some way preferable.</div>
<div>
<p><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue,
Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Score is
Approval with a "I wish to weaken the
effect of my vote for the sake of being
more sincere/expressive" box/button.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[/quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">If
that’s how you want to vote in Score,
then suit yourself.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">The
right use of Score:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Use only
min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as
Approval.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">…with
the difference that, when it’s uncertain
whether or not a candidate deserves
approval, you can give hir partial
approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Nice,
sometimes convenient, because,
otherwise, the only way to give someone
partial approval would be
probabilistically.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">But
Score loses Approval’s absolute
minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Much
better to let the voters deal with such
things for themselves with the
absolutely minimal handtool, than to use
some arbitrary & (somewhat or
greatly) complicated definition, rule
& count. …with the consequent
expense & count-fraud vulnerability.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"> So it is
strategically equivalent to
Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto">More complicated, yes.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I strongly oppose a runoff
for Approval, but some jurisdictions
might insist on one. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…likewise Score. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s true that it somewhat
increases Condorcet-efficiency &
Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great
strategy-complication, including the
loss of FBC compliance.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than
Hare because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount
Score’s merit.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much, much simpler
than Hare, resulting in much better
count-fraud security.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much less expensive
to administer & implement than Hare.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much simpler to
describe its workings when proposing it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"><br>
<br>
And Approval has a quite good
reputation here because it meets
Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and
compared with FPP the winner<br>
will strongly tend to have higher
social utility and be much more
likely a sincere Condorcet
winner. Also, and not
unrelatedly, <br>
it has a bias toward centrists
that some people think is
wonderful.<br>
<br>
But some people seem to think that
adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
in the case of STAR) to Score (to
make STAR) is just<br>
a harmless little gimmick that
just makes the method "a bit more
accurate", brings it into
compliance with Condorcet Loser<br>
and so must make it more
"Condorcet efficient".
("Sky-high" according to CLC
here).<br>
<br>
But actually it makes the method
profoundly different and very bad.
It seems to me that the inventors
of STAR must have been <br>
motivated by three priorities:<br>
<br>
(1) the method isn't Hare, <br>
<br>
(2) the method, in a purely
technical and completely useless
way, apparently meets Mono-raise
(aka Monotonicity).<br>
<br>
(3) subject to being saleable to
and understood by not-so-deep
thinkers, the method be as bad as
possible.<br>
<br>
From the "equal-vote" website:
<a href="https://www.equal.vote/"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.equal.vote/</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Ranked
Choice Voting, where voters rank
candidates in order of
preference has been lauded as a
solution, but in elections where
the third candidate is actually
competitive,<span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span></span><a rel="noopener"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s"
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vote-splitting
remains a serious issue</a><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span>and RCV only offers a
marginal improvement compared to
a primary and general election
with Choose-One Plurality
voting.</span></blockquote>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Luckily,
many voting methods are can
effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out,
when voters can weigh in on each
candidate individually, when all
ballot data is counted, and when
voters are able to show equal
preference, vote-splitting can
be eliminated. All voting
methods which do this pass the</span><span
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"> </span><a
rel="noopener"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion"
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Equal
Vote Criterion</a><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,
including </span><a
rel="noopener"
href="https://www.starvoting.us/star"
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">STAR
Voting</a><span
style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,...</span></blockquote>
<br>
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just
propaganda nonsense: <a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The
Equal Vote Criterion or<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a
rel="nofollow"
href="https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote"
style="text-decoration:none;background-image:url("");background-size:0.857em;padding-right:1em;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204);background-position:right center;background-repeat:no-repeat no-repeat"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Equality
Criterion</a><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is
a<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion"
title="Voting system criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">voting
method criterion</a><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>which
requires that a voting method
ensure that every voter may cast
a vote which is as powerful as a
vote cast by any other voter.
Voting methods which pass the
Equal Vote Criterion do not
exhibit<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting" title="Vote-splitting"
style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vote-splitting</a><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>or
the "Spoiler Effect," ensuring
that every vote can cast an<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote"
title="Equally Weighted Vote"
style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">equally
weighted vote</a><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Choose-One
Plurality Voting (First Past the
Post) and Instant Runoff Voting
(often referred to as Ranked
Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.</span></blockquote>
<br>
This is just dishonest blather. If
anything meets this very vague and
confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare)
certainly does. <br>
<br>
The classic scenario that motivated
some people get negative about Hare
(and also methods like Min-Max
Margins):<br>
<br>
49 Bush<br>
24 Gore<br>
27 Nader>Gore<br>
<p>Gore>Bush 51-49,
Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore
27-24.<br>
<br>
Hare eliminates Gore and elects
Bush, so the Nader voters whose
Gore> Bush preference was
strong had incentive to use the
Compromise <br>
strategy and vote Gore>Nader
("betraying" their sincere
favourite). If the method was
Approval they could have approved
both Nader and<br>
Gore, preventing the election of
Bush without having to vote their
sincere favorite below equal-top.<br>
<br>
But in this type of scenario STAR
does no better than Hare. The
Nader voters would have incentive
to give Nader zero points.<br>
<br>
"Traditionally" Hare's
vulnerability to Push-over
strategy has said to be a result
of it's failure of Mono-raise.
But STAR is much more vulnerable<br>
to Push-over.<br>
<br>
Say you are sure that your
favourite will make the final two.
In that case then you have
incentive to give every candidate
that you are sure your<br>
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.
If 5 stars then you are relying on
you favourite winning the runoff
without your help, but if 4 stars
then you might<br>
fail to get one of the predicted
sure-loser turkeys into the final.<br>
<br>
In a Hare Push-over strategy
scenario, the strategists rely on
their favourite winning the runoff
against their own votes, i.e. with
their votes supporting<br>
the turkey against their
favourite. This makes it much more
risky (more likely to backfire)
and difficult to coordinate than
is the case with STAR.<br>
<br>
The equal-vote site has a link to
a quite ok video on the Favorite
Betrayal Criterion. I find that
weird and misleading, because STAR
badly fails FBC.<br>
<a
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ</a><br>
<br>
From <a
href="https://www.starvoting.org/" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.starvoting.org/</a><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Montserrat,sans-serif;font-weight:700;line-height:1.2;font-size:2.25rem;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(2,106,134)">Why
STAR Voting? </h2>
<p
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Voting
reform is the keystone. A
single cause with the
potential to empower us to be
more effective on every other
issue we care about. </span></p>
<ul
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<li
style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a
rel="noopener"
href="https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting"
style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Honesty
is the best strategy.
Strategic voting is not
incentivized.</a></p>
</li>
<li
style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a
rel="noopener"
href="https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote"
style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Even
if your favorite can’t
win, your vote helps
prevent your worst case
scenario.</a></p>
</li>
<li
style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p
style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a
rel="noopener"
href="https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy"
style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Highly
accurate, no matter how
many candidates/parties
are in the race.</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate"
is supposed to mean, but I refute
the suggestion that these claims are
more true of STAR than they are of
Hare.<br>
<br>
In the poll I will vote STAR below
Hare and Approval and all the
Condorcet methods.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode"><br>
<p>Chris<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
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