[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Wed Apr 10 19:59:36 PDT 2024
>
> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
Because STAR is much more vulnerable to Pushover than Hare, that may not
always be the best strategy. You might do better
to give max or near-max to an an unacceptable (or more than one) that
won't pairwise beat the anticipated acceptable
finalist.
And/or you may do better to give one or more of the acceptables zero so
as to keep them out of the final where they will lose to
unacceptable.
You are torn between trying to get two acceptables into the final versus
trying to get the acceptable versus unacceptable
match-up that will most likely result in the acceptable winning. And if
you are trying to do the latter you are torn between giving
max to a turkey unacceptable (to maximise his/her chance of making it
into the final) and giving near-max (to maximise the chance
that the turkey doesn't win in the final).
> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of
> your acceptables.
>
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
known clear front-runners and the supporters of the candidates you deem
acceptable don't
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which are
not.
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
set of acceptable candidates above all the others and benefit from the
method's compliance with
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
candidate you
would in FPP.
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is
much lower.
Chris
On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
> Michael wrote:
>
>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>
>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>
> No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>
>
> I said “some”, not “all”.
>
> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>
> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of
> your acceptables.
>
> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>
>
>
>
> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
> horror of STAR.
>
> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>
> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>
>
> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject
> runoff with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>
> I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>
>
> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
> or common sense because STAR is obviously
> so silly and arbitrary.
>
>
> See above.
>
>
>
> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
> Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
> and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>
> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some
> criterion
> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
> suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>
>
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham
>> <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> [quote]
>> Score is Approval with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>> [/quote]
>>
>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>
>> The right use of Score:
>>
>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>
>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval,
>> by an intermediate point-rating.
>>
>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
>> give someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>
>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>> unarbitrariness.
>>
>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for
>> themselves with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some
>> arbitrary & (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule &
>> count. …with the consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>
>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being
>> more complicated and less fair.
>>
>> More complicated, yes.
>>
>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>> might insist on one.
>>
>> …likewise Score.
>>
>> It’s true that it somewhat increases Condorcet-efficiency &
>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication,
>> including the loss of FBC compliance.
>>
>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>
>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>
>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>> count-fraud security.
>>
>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>
>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>
>>
>>
>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it
>> meets Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the
>> winner
>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and be much
>> more likely a sincere Condorcet winner. Also, and not
>> unrelatedly,
>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is
>> wonderful.
>>
>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit
>> more accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient". ("Sky-high"
>> according to CLC here).
>>
>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and
>> very bad. It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have
>> been
>> motivated by three priorities:
>>
>> (1) the method isn't Hare,
>>
>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless
>> way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>
>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by
>> not-so-deep thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>
>> From the "equal-vote" website: https://www.equal.vote/
>>
>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order
>>> of preference has been lauded as a solution, but in
>>> elections where the third candidate is actually
>>> competitive,vote-splitting remains a serious issue
>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s>and RCV
>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary
>>> and general election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>
>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on
>>> each candidate individually, when all ballot data is
>>> counted, and when voters are able to show equal preference,
>>> vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods which
>>> do this pass theEqual Vote Criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>,
>>> including STAR Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>
>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda nonsense:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>> The Equal Vote Criterion orEquality Criterion
>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote>is avoting method
>>> criterion
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion>which
>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may
>>> cast a vote which is as powerful as a vote cast by any other
>>> voter. Voting methods which pass the Equal Vote Criterion do
>>> not exhibitvote-splitting
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting>or the "Spoiler
>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast anequally
>>> weighted vote
>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and
>>> Instant Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice
>>> Voting) do not satisfy the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>
>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very
>> vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>
>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative
>> about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>
>> 49 Bush
>> 24 Gore
>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>
>> Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>
>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters
>> whose Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use
>> the Compromise
>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>> favourite). If the method was Approval they could have
>> approved both Nader and
>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote
>> their sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>
>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare.
>> The Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>
>> "Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over strategy
>> has said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise. But
>> STAR is much more vulnerable
>> to Push-over.
>>
>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two.
>> In that case then you have incentive to give every candidate
>> that you are sure your
>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you are
>> relying on you favourite winning the runoff without your
>> help, but if 4 stars then you might
>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the
>> final.
>>
>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely
>> on their favourite winning the runoff against their own
>> votes, i.e. with their votes supporting
>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more
>> risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate
>> than is the case with STAR.
>>
>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the
>> Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird and
>> misleading, because STAR badly fails FBC.
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>
>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>
>>>
>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>
>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the
>>> potential to empower us to be more effective on every other
>>> issue we care about.
>>>
>>> *
>>>
>>> Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>> incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>
>>> *
>>>
>>> Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent
>>> your worst case scenario.
>>> <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>
>>> *
>>>
>>> Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties
>>> are in the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but
>> I refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of
>> STAR than they are of Hare.
>>
>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all
>> the Condorcet methods.
>>
>> Chris
>>
>>
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