[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

[fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com]

(This kind of hostility and condescending tone is why I don't participate
much on this mailing list, even as a pseudonym.)

I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute the
> suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of Hare.


STAR has substantially better Social Utility Efficiency and Condorcet
Efficiency than Hare, which, to people like me, are more important than
other criteria.

I don't believe people generally *want* to vote strategically; they are
just forced to because systems like FPTP are so bad.  So STAR failing to
meet one or two binary strategy-resistance criteria doesn't seem like an
important real-world problem to me.  I don't think voters generally have
the knowledge or desire to exploit them, but I'm open to hearing about
realistic scenarios in which it performs worse than other systems.

I don't know about the motivations of the inventors of STAR, but my
motivations for supporting STAR are better representation, reducing
polarization, and breaking the two-party system, which I don't believe Hare
accomplishes.

Hare's elimination process means it doesn't count all preferences expressed
by the voters, and suffers from the same vote-splitting as FPTP, resulting
in undemocratic outcomes and perpetuating the problems that I would like to
fix (spoiler effect, center-squeeze, two-party system, polarization).  I
don't think we should throw away some voters' preferences in order to make
the ballots easier to count.
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