[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[James Gilmour]

I don't think any "open-ended" question could give clear and unambiguous results.  For that you need two separate polls: one on
election methods for single-winner elections; the other, separate poll, on election methods for multi-winner elections.
James Gilmour


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Election-Methods [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Joshua Boehme
> Sent: 05 April 2024 22:05
> To: 'EM' <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections
> 
> 
> I had a similar thought. If the question is more open-ended, maybe adding "(if applicable)" to the proportional
> representation option would make it clearer. (My thought process here is that one of the goals of this poll is to
> summarize current thinking for *non*-experts, so extra little nudges of explanation can help.)
> 
> 
> On 4/5/24 16:14, James Gilmour wrote:
> > There's some muddled thinking here.
> >
> > If you are electing a president or a mayor, you will use a single-winner election method.
> >
> > If you are electing a "representative assembly" like a parliament or town council, you would use (should use) a multi-
> winner election method.  Only be using a multi-winner method can you begin to ensure that the elected assembly is
> properly representative of those who voted.
> >
> > So before you hold your "Poll on voting systems", you must define the purpose of the election for which the voting
> system is to be used.
> >
> > James Gilmour
> > Edinburgh, Scotland
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Election-Methods
> >> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of
> >> Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> >> Sent: 05 April 2024 18:55
> >> To: Filip Ejlak <tersander at gmail.com>; EM
> >> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> >> Subject: Re: [EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in
> >> upcoming enactment-elections
> >>
> >> On 2024-04-05 16:03, Filip Ejlak wrote:
> >>> First thing: it's surprising how all the options that have been
> >>> mentioned are single-winner methods, despite the poll subject not
> >>> being worded in such a restrictive way. Are multi-winner options
> >>> allowed as well, or should this be a different poll? Because it
> >>> needs to be said that _every legislative election needs proportional
> >>> representation_. I guess any single-winner method, no matter how
> >>> good, will be bad in comparison with a PR method. So if multi-winner
> >>> options were allowed in the poll, I would nominate *STV *(a
> >>> Condorcet-compliant variant would be better if there was any
> >>> polynomial one with good recognition; an optional indirect element -
> >>> like GVT, but strongly improved - would also be nice).
> >>>
> >>> And speaking of single-winner methods, in my opinion *Woodall* and
> >>> *Benham* seem to be the best, at least among the well-known ones.
> >>> While Woodall (especially Schwartz Woodall) is perhaps marginally
> >>> better, Benham is so easy to explain (and it's a very
> >>> obvious/natural way to make IRV actually good) that it should be
> >>> seriously considered by voting reform campaigners. So I'd like to nominate these two.
> >>
> >> I agree: if the poll is primarily meant to be about single-winner
> >> methods, it would still be useful to have a "use multiwinner PR instead"
> >> option, to see how well it would do compared to the single-winner methods.
> >>
> >> I'd also suggest the following methods:
> >>
> >> Majority Judgement (as a category; includes usual judgement etc.)
> >> Approval with manual runoff (since it has seen actual
> >> use) Copeland//Borda (proposed by Equal Vote)
> >>
> >> and to echo Joshua Boehme, I'd also like to know what it's a poll of:
> >> the theoretically best method, the one with best chance of passing a
> >> reform effort, most bang for the buck, or something else?
> >>
> >> On an aside, STV with ranked pairs elimination is not too bad a
> >> polytime Condorcet-reducing STV method IMHO. RP's LIIA compliance
> >> reduces the chaos you would otherwise get from elimination. It tends
> >> to have somewhat of a center bias within the "clusters" (solid coalitions entitled representation by Droop
> proportionality), but that might not be too bad if it deters extremist kingmaker scenarios.
> >> 	(You'd do a ranked pairs election every time you've elected someone
> >> and eliminated him from the ballots, then eliminate from the RP loser
> >> up until someone exceeds the quota, then elect him, distribute
> >> surpluses, and do a new RP election, and so on.)
> >>
> >> -km