[EM] Trying to understand BSTV

[Filip Ejlak]

This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to understand
Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do Binomial STV with
10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV contest for 4 winners with
a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 losers, with a candidate being
excluded in one sub-election iff they have won a seat in the other
sub-election? If that's right, isn't it unfortunately a very
clone-dependent solution? If that's not right, what's the actual algorithm?



Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com> wrote:

>
> “I DO object to STV’s negative response”
>
>  It does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else objects
> to an election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The Elements of
> Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of opinion, but a
> matter of demonstration.
>
> It is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional counts to
> Webster/Sainte Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally STV
> used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum PR, as the Hare
> quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a Harmonic Mean
> quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality to the Sainte
> Lague divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just turned out
> to have that extra confirmation.
>
> As a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order) Binomial STV
> and supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The other day I
> learned that GitHub suffered a mass malware attack in 2023, from which they
> maybe did not completely recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So
> I welcome it being looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not
> received the links.
>
> First order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional STV. It
> is a one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to STV but
> to all the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth methods.
> That is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because their
> rules differ as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle,
> election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election is another
> voters exclusion
>
> Binomial STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as
> excluding candidates. In other words, it is symmetrical as to election and
> exclusion. First order STV involves two counts, an election count of
> preferences and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts use
> Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly the same
> procedure, whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election
> quota or an exclusion quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count
> is an iteration of the election count.
>
> However, first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it dispenses
> with its “last past the post” exclusion method, when election surpluses run
> out. It also dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing the quota as
> voters abstain their preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information
> is counted, thus satisfying the principle of the conservation of
> (preferential) information, fundamental to science or organised knowledge.
>
> Regards,
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
>
> On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the reply.
> So let me resume:
>
> As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative response, because
> Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any negative response.  …& STV is a
> humongously elaborate complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment
> & software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment & no software
> modification. The allocations to parties & their candidates can be
> determined at any kitchen table where there’s a hand-calculator.
>
> To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:
>
> It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked middle compromise, & it
> would be better to have the winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare,
>  which always chooses the favorite of the largest faction of the
> Mutual-Majority when there is once.
>
> But, to best & always & most reliably eliminated perceived lesser-evil
> giveaway-need, it’s necessary to always elect the CW, however unfavorite.
> So I propose RP(wv) when rank-balloting is insisted-on.
>
> … but would support a Hare proposal if Hare  is honestly offered.  It
> currently is not.
>
> There might be other comments in that post that I’d like to reply to, if I
> can find it.
>
>
>
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