<div dir="ltr"><div>This is a question primarily to Richard Lung, as I am trying to understand Binomial STV (and perhaps simulate it). If we want to do Binomial STV with 10 candidates and 4 seats, do we just do an STV contest for 4 winners with a simultaneous "inversed" STV contest for 6 losers, with a candidate being excluded in one sub-election iff they have won a seat in the other sub-election? If that's right, isn't it unfortunately a very clone-dependent solution? If that's not right, what's the actual algorithm?</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Richard Lung <<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">“I
DO object to STV’s negative response”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> It
does not matter whether Mr Ossipoff, you or I, or anyone else
objects to an
election method. As HG Wells said over a century ago (The
Elements of
Reconstruction, 1916) voting method is not a matter of opinion,
but a matter of
demonstration.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">It
is perfectly possible for STV to use equivalent proportional
counts to Webster/Sainte
Lague and the d’Hondt rule divisor methods. Originally
STV used the Hare quota. The Droop quota is merely the minimum
PR, as the Hare
quota is the maximum PR. I have recommended the average PR, a
Harmonic Mean
quota, V/(S+1/2) which is equivalent for proportionality to the
Sainte Lague
divisor rule. But I invented it for other reasons. It just
turned out to have
that extra confirmation.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">As
a matter of fact, I hired the programming of (first order)
Binomial STV and
supplied the list with some links, including to GitHub. The
other day I learned that GitHub
suffered a mass malware attack in 2023, from which they maybe
did not
completely recover. I have no technical knowledge myself. So I
welcome it being
looked into by admin, but that is why the list has not received
the links.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">First
order Binomial STV is simpler in principle than conventional
STV. It is a
one-truth election method, which makes it unique, not only to
STV but to all
the worlds election methods, which are at least two-truth
methods. That
is to say, they are “unscientific” or inconsistent, because
their rules differ
as to how they elect or exclude candidates. In principle,
election and exclusion are the same, because one voters election
is another voters exclusion<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Binomial
STV (not only first order) uses the same method for electing as
excluding candidates.
In other words, it is symmetrical as to election and exclusion.
First
order STV involves two counts, an election count of preferences
and an exclusion count of reversed preferences. Both counts
use Meek method computer count of surplus transfer, in exactly
the same procedure,
whether to elect candidates or exclude them (to an election
quota or an exclusion
quota, otherwise the same quota). The exclusion count is an
iteration of the election count.<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">However,
first order STV is simpler than Meek method, in that it
dispenses with its “last
past the post” exclusion method, when election surpluses run
out. It also
dispenses with the Meek method policy of reducing the quota as
voters abstain
their preferences. On the contrary, abstentions information is
counted, thus
satisfying the principle of the conservation of (preferential)
information,
fundamental to science or organised knowledge.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Regards,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Richard
Lung.</span></p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div>On 03/03/2024 02:21, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
My phone fell off its stand, resulting in premature sending of the
reply. So let me resume:
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">As I was saying, I DO object to STV’s negative
response, because Sainte-Lague & d’Hondt don’t have any
negative response. …& STV is a humongously elaborate
complex procedure, requiring new balloting equipment &
software…while list-PR requires no new balloting equipment &
no software modification. The allocations to parties & their
candidates can be determined at any kitchen table where there’s
a hand-calculator.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">To return to the matter of Hare single-winner:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s true that sometimes the CW is an unliked
middle compromise, & it would be better to have the
winner-favoriteness that comes with Hare, which always chooses
the favorite of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority when
there is once.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But, to best & always & most reliably
eliminated perceived lesser-evil giveaway-need, it’s necessary
to always elect the CW, however unfavorite. So I propose RP(wv)
when rank-balloting is insisted-on.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">… but would support a Hare proposal if Hare is
honestly offered. It currently is not.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">There might be other comments in that post that
I’d like to reply to, if I can find it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<br>
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