[EM] The Frequency of Condorcet Winners in Real Non-Political Elections

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Oooh wow, this seems like a great paper—thank you for sharing! Do you
happen to have the code and data somewhere? Thanks!

On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 5:08 PM Andrew Myers <andrew.myers at cornell.edu>
wrote:

> Here is a paper I recently presented at the 61st Public Choice Society
> Conference <https://publicchoicesociety.org/conference/2024>, containing
> results from analysis of tens of thousands of polls run on the CIVS system
> since 2003.
>
> The Frequency of Condorcet Winners in Real Non-Political Elections
> <https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/>
>
> Andrew C. Myers
> Condorcet-consistent voting is attractive because it follows the principle
> that the will of a majority of voters should not be denied. However, it is
> in general possible that there is no Condorcet winner: a cycle of
> candidates might exist in which each candidate is preferred to the next.
> The possibility that such a cycle occurs, and the uncertainty about how to
> handle it, have been an obstacle to the adoption of Condorcet methods. This
> paper reports on the experience from CIVS, a long-running open-source
> voting service that supports Condorcet-consistent voting methods. Over a
> period of about twenty years, users have conducted tens of thousands of
> polls using CIVS, including many with real-world consequences. During this
> time, CIVS has thus accumulated probably the largest existing corpus of
> data about how Condorcet voting functions in practice. CIVS supports
> multiple completion methods for handling cycles, but the data show that it
> usually does not matter which completion method is used, because there is
> rarely a cycle in polls with a large enough number of voters.
>
> Full text here: <https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/>
> <https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/>
>
> Cheers,
>
> -- Andrew
>
>
>
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>
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