[EM] Countering FairVote propaganda on Wikipedia
Closed Limelike Curves
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Mon Apr 1 09:16:05 PDT 2024
>
> So perhaps that should be replaced with a category listing, although it
> would be interesting to see the actual IIA failure rate for Range with
> automatic normalization (or above-mean approval strategy). Then again,
> filling in numbers based on simulations from EM might be considered OR;
> I don't know what the burden of proof/reliability rules of Wikipedia
> would say.
>
It's not OR if you put it on Arxiv first. ;)
IIA compliance might be less informative than you'd think, because every
> Condorcet method has the same frequency of IIA failures: you can remove
> a subset of non-winners to change the winner iff there is no Condorcet
> winner. Non-Condorcet ranked methods are worse: they fail when there's a
> cycle, and also whenever they fail to elect the CW.
>
Ooh, that's true. How about a spoiler index instead, then, going by the
winner's change in position? So, for example, if the runner-up is elected
after adding/removing a spoiler, that contributes 1 point; 2 points if it's
the third-place finisher, etc.
On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 3:08 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:
> On 2024-03-22 02:49, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> > These are great suggestions, thank you :)
> >
> > For organizing the criteria, my proposal is to replace the current table
> > with maybe 5 numbers:
> > 1. Condorcet efficiency
> > 2. Social utility efficiency
> > 3. Spoiler resistance (IIA compliance)
> > 4. Participation satisfaction
> > 5. Monotonicity satisfaction
> >
> > (Is Jameson Quinn on this email list? I know he had some relevant
> > simulations.)
>
> IIA compliance might be less informative than you'd think, because every
> Condorcet method has the same frequency of IIA failures: you can remove
> a subset of non-winners to change the winner iff there is no Condorcet
> winner. Non-Condorcet ranked methods are worse: they fail when there's a
> cycle, and also whenever they fail to elect the CW.
>
> So perhaps that should be replaced with a category listing, although it
> would be interesting to see the actual IIA failure rate for Range with
> automatic normalization (or above-mean approval strategy). Then again,
> filling in numbers based on simulations from EM might be considered OR;
> I don't know what the burden of proof/reliability rules of Wikipedia
> would say.
>
> Possible categories could be:
> passes IIA (e.g. cardinal with an absolute scale, random pair)
> LIIA (Ranked pairs, River)
> ISDA (Smith//IRV)
> Condorcet (Minmax)
> None of the above (Plurality).
>
> Alternatively having clone independence instead of IIA would be better
> at differentiating between the methods. I would also suggest a strategy
> resistance number, by James Green-Armytage's definition. And summability.
>
> Although if you're doing clone independence, JGA's strategic exit/entry
> might give a better idea of strategic nomination resistance, since some
> nominally clone independent methods have incentive to enter or exit - in
> particular IRV.
>
> Jameson used to be on the list, but he hasn't posted since 2018.
>
> -km
>
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