[EM] Reply to Rob regarding RCV
email9648742 at gmail.com
Sun Sep 24 14:55:54 PDT 2023
Sure, I said that I prefer the Pairwise-Count Condorcet-Criterion methods,
because they’re the ones that get rid of the Lesser-of-Two-Evils problem
As I said, RCV’s disadvantage is that its merit & workability depend
strongly on the character of the electorate, & on the candidate-lineup.
…& yes, I’m talking about voters who won’t make the big giveaway compromise.
It’s a philosophical question: Is giveaway incentive a problem when the
electorate aren’t interested in giving it away?
It isn’t a problem to them, nor, in that case, to me.
As I said, an electorate who have just enacted RCV by referendum didn’t do
so because they want to vote some one whom they don’t like over their
favorite. They want rankings because they want to rank sincerely. They will.
On Sun, Sep 24, 2023 at 13:52 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> On 2023-09-23 21:34, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> > I mean the former. The people who will always vote a deplorable sleazy
> > corrupt POS “lesser” evil over what we’d all like, against the hopes of
> > nearly all of us, because they’re being routinely threatened with a
> > greater evil.
> Then I'd like to note that the "only" if not an iff: IRV can still have
> trouble when voters aren't timid overcompromisers.
> Consider Burlington. It's reasonable to assume that the
> Wright>Montroll>Kiss voters weren't compromising; if they had
> compromised for Montroll, then IRV would have elected the CW. But they
> didn't, so it didn't.
> In a way, Condorcet auto-compromises for coherent majorities: suppose
> the electorate knew who would win with the original method. Then if
> there existed a sincere CW who was not elected, a majority could have
> compromised for the CW by ranking him first, thus making him win. In
> that sense, Condorcet is good for voters who *don't* compromise.
> Now one could say that voters who don't compromise don't care about
> compromise incentive, because they will never take advantage of it no
> matter how high it is. But tactical voting incentives can also indicate
> that the method is getting the honest outcome wrong.
> E.g. Plurality has lots of compromise incentive. Suppose you have an
> idealized electorate of voters who think that compromising is inherently
> wrong and swear not to use it. Plurality would still be a bad method; it
> would still get 2D spatial elections like the Tennessee example wrong.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Election-Methods