[EM] Sequential-Pairwise offensive & defensive strategy?

[Michael Ossipoff]

If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is
determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a
later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the
comparison-order will be…

…

…& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is
now in political-elections…

…

…Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with
gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD?



…And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that
offensive strategy?



…That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less
computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods.

If, using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is
determined by giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a
later position in the comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the
comparison-order will be…

…

…& if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is
now in political-elections…

…

…Does that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with
gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD?



…And, if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that
offensive strategy?



…That seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less
computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods.
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