[EM] Fwd: Our (most recent) Condorcet Takedowm Elimination (CTE) Proposal

Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Mon Oct 9 17:28:32 PDT 2023


Michael Ossipoff and I have been working on "take-down elimination" as a
device for making offensive burial strategy back fire on the burier faction.

As rational voters realize how dependably this method makes burial strategy
back-fire, strategic voters will find intentional insincere cycle creation
to be too risky to try.

And without the existence of these insincere "beat cycles", the first
simple step in the following method completely determines the winner;

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
Date: Sun, Oct 8, 2023, 2:56 PM
Subject: My Ideal Condorcet Takedowm Elimination (CTE) Proposal
To: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>


1. Elect the undefeated candidate when there is one ... else ...
eliminate any candidate that defeats no other candidate ... and ...
2. List the remaining candidates in order of their Nominal Favorability
Score" NFS.
3. Update the list by Sink Sorting it pairwise.
4. Let P (for Pivot) be the candidate that has sunk to the bottom of the
list.
5. Eliminate P along with any candidates defeated by P.
6. While more than one candidate remains, repeat steps 2 through 5.
7. Elect the uneliminated candidate.

The NFS of a candidate might be its Top Count, its total Approval (implicit
or otherwise), its Range Score, its Max Winning Vote Score, it Max Losing
Vote Score, its Borda Count, its Weighted Geometric Pairwise Support Score,
etc.

Note that high bottom count (as in Coombs) is the same as low Implicit
Approval score.

The important thing is that it be determined democratically well before the
election.

The method elects uncovered candidates, satisfjes Independence from Smith
Dominated Alternatives (ISDA), and is highly burial resistant ... for any
reasonable choice of NFS.

Step 2 is essential to the method's compliance with ISDA.

Because of it's ISDA compliance, any method whatsoever can be used to
narrow down to Smith. Then almost certainly one final step will determine
the winner.

If that final step is monotonic, then the method is monotonic.

This ISDA mediated shortcut is essential in any NFS version where the vote
transfers between eliminations are messy.

fws
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