[EM] Practical Condorcet
Forest Simmons
forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Tue Mar 7 01:08:52 PST 2023
Remember the "strongest pair" winner method?
The thing that side-tracked me was trying to guarantee Smith efficiency in
a simple way that would not scare away the innumerate.
I think I may have a solution to that challenge.
Here's my presentation idea:
In the context of single winner deterministic elections, when we have a
candidate that is preferred by a majority of the participating voters over
any competing candidate ... basic majority rule principles suggest electing
that candidate as a matter of policy.
But what about the one-in-a-hundred possibility of non-existence of such a
candidate?
In that case, almost certainly there will be at least one pair of
candidates such that no other candidate defeats both of them.
Such a pair is called a covering pair.
It seems reasonable to elect the pairwise winner of the strongest defeat
covering pair.
One possible measure of defeat strength is winner's pairwise support (wv):
x ABC (sincere is ACB)
y BCA
Z CAB
Assume z<min(x,y)
B beats C with strength x+y=n-z, where n is the total number of ballots
x+y+z.
This is the strongest defeat.
B wins thereby making the A faction burial of C backfire.
There may be a better choice of defeat strength ... we'll have to
experiment.
Note the simplicity of getting ISDA without mentioning Smith!
Suggestions?
-Forest
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