[EM] Monotonic Burial Resistant Method

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 7/6/23 19:33, Forest Simmons wrote:

>     This produces the following example:
>              2: A>B>C
>              1: B>C>A (honest is B>A>C)
>              2: C>A>B
> 
>     It's an A>B>C>A cycle: A has 2 first preferences out of 5, hence >1/3
>     first preferences. The probabilities of a ballot having a last
>     preference for
>              A is 1/5
>              B is 2/5
>              C is 3/5
> 
> Since these events are mutually exclusive, the probabilities should not 
> surpass 100 percent.

You're right. I had originally written an example with more voters and I 
forgot to update the numerators. The right numbers are:

	A: 1/5
	B: 2/5
	C: 2/5

which can be seen by counting last preference votes.

So the penalties should be:

A: (C's probability): 2/5
B: (A's probability): 1/5
C: (B's probability): 2/5

B>A=C

Does that seem right?

-km