[EM] Hey guys, look at this...

[Forest Simmons]

But now we have a better use of score ballots ... Rob Lanphier's imperative
that whatever method we advocate should be flexible  enough to accept both
rankings and ratings ... like the engine of an Army deuce and a half that
will run on anything from salad dressing to jet fuel.

So this definition is intended to make sense with both types of ballots.

A candidates Top count is the number of ballots that do not rank or rate
any other candidate above it.

Similarly, a candidate's Bottom count is the number of ballots that do not
rank or rate any other candidate above it.

Our method is based on Robert's imperative that a nominal (tentative)
standard of "worst" can be trumped by direct democratic comparison.

For example, the Condorcet Loser, a candidate that is democratically weaker
in comparison to any other candidate is trumped by any other candidate,
nominal judgments of "worst" to the contrary not withstanding.

Candidate Y is deemed to be democratically weaker than X, if X is ranked or
rated above Y by a majority of the participating voters ... even if the
nominal/tentative standard of "worst" favors Y over X.

How strong can a candidate actually be if (according to their preference
ballots) a majority of the participating voters prefer the nominally worst
candidate over it?

We start by listing the candidates from worst to best by our nominal
standard of worst, which is the same as IRV's ... the smallest top count
... with ties decided by worst bottom count.

Then while any candidate remains on the list, strike from it the worst
remaining candidate ... after first striking any (and every) democratically
weaker candidate (if any exists).

When this elimination process has whittled the list down to one candidate,
that's the election winner.

This formulation with the top and bottom counts determined before any
candidates are stricken from the list ... makes for a method that is
(unlike IRV) a one pass, precinct summable, monotonic method.

Did I mention clone proof and ISDA?

In fact, not only Landau efficient (electing only uncovered candidated) but
Banks efficient ... the winner stands at the head of a maximal chain
totally ordered by pairwise defeat. [The other members of the chain are the
last to be stricken st each eliminationvstage.]

How does this proposal strike you?

(Not from any good list,I hope)

-Forest







On Wed, Feb 22, 2023, 4:40 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2/22/23 04:39, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Why have the STAR folks stubbornly dug in their heels with a clone
> > dependent version when one simple change would make it both Condorcet
> > efficient and clone-independent?
>
> And for those who like a theoretical challenge, there's still the design
> question of making a method that takes von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
> to their logical conclusion while remaining cloneproof and dealing with
> Range's strategy problems.
>
> In a three-candidate election, we don't know if a particular voter's
> 9/10 is the same as another voter's 9/10. But we can infer lottery
> probabilities. So each voter's ballot can be normalized to (1, a, 0) if
> we use l_infinity normalization.
>
> So we could do just a normalized Range, but this has undesirable
> strategic consequences - the usual Burr dilemma, minmaxing, etc. With
> different normalization types (e.g. l_2 cumulative voting) that's
> mitigated but at the cost of it no longer being cloneproof
> (vote-splitting).
>
> I thought that perhaps something with the logic of a Condorcet method
> would work better, with, instead of pairwise contests, there would be
> pairwise triples: the minimum necessary to capture strength of
> preferences. But I just couldn't make it cloneproof.
>
> -km
>
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