[EM] High5 voting (~ Smith//Approval on a reduced set)

[Michael Ossipoff]

…& the multi-part count would make for complicated strategy-calculation.


On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 20:03 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I like various different kinds of voting reforms, including this one (That
> doesn’t that mean I’d propose it).
>
> Some methods that I like are too complicated, or make too much demand on
> voters, or are too arbitrary. This is one such.
>
> If there’s a Condorcet proposal as complicated as High-Five, I don’t know
> about it.
>
> I like High-Five’s evaluatory ratings.
>
> E & Reject should be combined as Reject.
>
> The uses of the ratings in the count seem arbitrary. I’m not saying that
> it doesn’t sound right, but it’s just that there are many ways it could be
> done.
>
> As much as I like the evaluatory ratings, I don’t know how many people
> would agree & want to be expected to vote all the candidates by all those
> merit-levels. I like it, but would it play in Peoria?
>
> And it remains a rating-system. As such, it can’t match the
> strategy-freeness of Condorcet.
>
> It’s complexity completely wipes-out the huge simplicity, familiarity  &
> unarbitrariness-elegance advantage of STAR & Approval.
>
> For me as a voter High-Five would be fine, & it’s one of those that I
> like, but it doesn’t meet the needs for a public-proposal.
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 12:29 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I've been mulling over ways to get a Smith/Approval method into a
>> somewhat practical form, and have taken some cues from Jameson Quinn's
>> Vote-321.
>>
>> Vote-321 is a pretty method, with a lot of strategy resistance, and if it
>> were among the options for a new voting system (with no Condorcet method
>> available), I would choose it immediately.
>>
>> However, I have a few issues with it: vulnerability to cloning; lack of
>> expression; and what I consider a too-small provisional subset. The latter
>> is more of a psychological / media problem, and what I mean by "too-small"
>> is that if only the top three first-place candidates make it past the first
>> pass, public attention could be excessively focused on the front-runners at
>> the cost of addressing issues raised by less popular candidates. But the
>> too-small subset is also what enables Vote-321's vulnerability to cloning.
>> By including at least one or two more candidates in the first pass of
>> candidate reduction, cloning risk is reduced.
>>
>> Following is what I call the *High 5 *method for three or more
>> candidates:
>>
>> *Ballot Expression:*
>> I prefer a 6 slot ranked ballot, equal-ranking and gaps allowed, with the
>> rank/tiers named as follows:
>>
>>
>> Tier Name
>>
>> Approval Status
>>
>> Description
>>
>> A
>>
>> Approved
>>
>> Most Preferred / Best / Favorite
>>
>> B
>>
>> Approved
>>
>> Good
>>
>> C
>>
>> Approved
>>
>> OK / Acceptable
>>
>> D
>>
>> Disapproved
>>
>> Not Preferred, but would be in their coalition (i.e. Compromise)
>>
>> E
>>
>> Disapproved
>>
>> Mostly Unacceptable but Lesser Evil
>>
>> Reject
>>
>> Dispapproved
>>
>> Completely unacceptable
>>
>> Summarized, there are 3 approved ranks (Most Preferred, Good, OK), 2
>> disapproved ranks (compromise, lesser of two evils), and Reject. Blank
>> ballots are counted as rejection.
>>
>> *Tabulation:*
>>
>>    - Total most-preferred votes per candidate (i.e. "A" votes).
>>    - Approval / Disapproval totals per candidate
>>    - Pairwise preference array
>>    - Optional:
>>       - Tied-Approval pairwise
>>       - Tied-Disapproval (above reject) pairwise
>>       - Approved vs Disapproved/Reject pairwise
>>
>> *First-pass subset:*
>>
>>    - *Top 5 candidates by most-preferred votes*
>>
>> *Procedure:*
>>
>>    - Of the top 5 most-preferred candidates are found, drop the
>>    least-approved candidate.
>>    - Among the remaining candidates, use the pairwise preference array
>>    to find the Smith Set
>>    - If more than one candidate is in the Smith Set, pick the most
>>    approved member of the set as the winner.
>>
>> If you start with 3 candidates, this method reduces to top-two approval.
>>
>> Starting with 4 candidates, this method reduces to sorting the candidates
>> by Approval and doing a top-three tournament: the winner is the pairwise
>> winner of A1 versus (the pairwise winner of A2 versus A3).
>>
>> For 5 or more candidates, the method has a very high probability of
>> finding the CW (if one exists) among the top five favorites, while falling
>> back to approval in the event of a cycle among the four most-approved of
>> those top five.
>>
>> In a "jungle-primary" type of situation (though no primary is necessary),
>> media attention would be given to at least the top 5 candidates instead of
>> just the top two, ensuring attention to a range of viewpoints. And in the
>> event of a large number of candidates, it would not be necessary to
>> tabulate pairwise preferences for more than 7 or 8 top-first-ranked
>> candidates as determined by pre-election polling, reducing tabulation
>> complexity while retaining summability.
>>
>> Using most-preferred votes for the first pass has a slight anti-cloning
>> effect, as a preference ballot would lead to a tendency toward vote
>> splitting if one faction has too many candidates. The anti-cloning pressure
>> is greater than in Vote-321 because of the larger range of expression.
>>
>> Finally, the Smith//Approval method, when combined with the explicit
>> approval cutoff ballot, allows enough strategy to reduce burial incentive.
>>
>> I'm calling this "High 5" voting because it's descriptive of both the
>> ranking method and the top-five most preferred first-level truncation, and
>> it's easier to remember than Smith//Approval.
>>
>> Thoughts?
>>
>> ----
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>> info
>>
>
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