[EM] Condorcet Meeting: Narrowing the Field

[C.Benham]

Forest,

I gather you envisage a high-turnout primary election with the final 
being held as soon as practicable afterwards.

On the issue of whether or not we sometimes dispense with the final 
because one candidate was so dominant in the primary,
we could have a rule about the winners final-two IRV count (or maybe 
some alternative, like minimum pairwise support) as a proportion
of the total number of eligible voters.

If that is too low, then maybe we can have a final anyway, say between 
the IRV winner and the candidate  with the most pairwise opposition
to the IRV winner  (and maybe if that isn't the IRV last-2 runner-up 
that candidate also if that pairwise result was "sufficiently", according to
some rule we make up, close).

There should be no simple rule that says we always have a final if the 
turnout for the primary is below X%, because that could sometimes cause
some faction of voters to have a strategic incentive to abstain from the 
primary.

Chris B.

On 1/09/2023 6:37 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Say the finalists are the IRV winner together with any and all of its 
> "enemies" (defined as those candidates that defeat it pairwise).
>
> If the IRV winner has no enemies, no need for any further runoff 
> beyond the Instant Runoff that just popped out the IRV winner.
>
> If the IRV winner has precisely one enemy, then the two-candidate 
> final runoff will be a no stress sincere choice for the voters.
>
> Otherwise, you have a potentially interesting runoff with "around 3 to 
> 5 candidates" to put the Condorcet Meetng through its paces.
>
> fws
>
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023, 11:51 AM Forest Simmons 
> <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>     Could the Implicit Approval winner ever be a Condorcet loser?
>
>     Highly unlikely, especially in the context of too many candidates,
>     etc. But if so, every other candidate would have a short beatpath
>     to it ... so no narrowing of the field would occur.
>
>     So it would be better to use the IRV winner or the MaxMax Pairwise
>     Support winner as the short beatpath target ... the winner of the
>     simplest method that satisfies the Condorcet Loser Criterion.
>
>     On Wed, Aug 30, 2023, 11:30 PM Forest Simmons
>     <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>         Voters strictly rank as many candidates as they care to.
>
>         The implicit it approval of a candidate is the number of
>         ballots on which it out ranks at least one other candidate.
>
>         Let S be the set of candidates tied for most implicit approval.
>
>         A candidate will advance to the final ballot if and only if it
>         has a beatpath of two or fewer steps to some member of S.
>
>         fws
>
>
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