[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Chris Benham]

Kristofer,

IMHO this is all far too complicated and completely wrong-headed.

For one thing, it seems to assume that major candidates have some 
interest in,
or in some way benefit from, displacing minor candidates off the final 
ballot.

In fact, with voluntary voting, they are just as likely to be harmed by 
them doing that
as helped.  Major moderate wing candidates can benefit by minor (sure 
loser) more extreme
candidates on the same wing being on the ballot, because they inspire 
more voters to turn out
who will help that moderate wing candidate to defeat the other major 
candidate/s.

So with your suggested method, a candidate could lose the election 
because it did too well in
the primary.

I only recently saw the first message in this thread, and was a bit 
surprised that the N suggested
was so small and elastic ("2-5").

My suggested solution assumed a fixed N.  I would have no problem with 
7, certainly at least 5.

If we are happy to have N elastic because we don't want any very weak 
candidates on the ballot,
then we can do IRV-style eliminations and vote transfers until the 
lowest tally of any not eliminated
candidate meets some arbitrary threshold and then we stop.

Or we can combine that with saying we are going to have at most X 
candidates.

I think I prefer a quite high fixed number.  Lots of candidates can help 
inspire turnout and make for
a wider and more interesting "battle of ideas".

Chris B.






> *Kristofer Munsterhjelm* km_elmet at t-online.de 
> <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3Ca4347551-24f9-f38b-be5b-bb3da1a4f5e3%40t-online.de%3E>
> /Mon Aug 28 12:37:50 PDT 2023/
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> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> On 8/28/23 19:24, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >/For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far. />//>/But the question remains about how to determine the number N. />//>/Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on />/the average primary ballot? /
> Here's a similar approach with an idea to preserve a kind of clone
> independence:
>
> Use STV, but don't eliminate candidates when they're elected, just
> reweight the ballots according to surplus instead.
>
> When a candidate is elected again, he only appears once in the final
> outcome, but the number of candidates in the outcome is reduced by one
> instead. In effect, the duplicate election leads to the election of a
> "hole" that takes up a spot without assigning any candidate to that spot.
>
> Say N = 5, so that the Droop quota is 1/6. Then a candidate with
> above-majority support (say 1/2 + epsilon) gets three such quotas, and
> is elected three times: once to get into the finalist set, and twice
> more to reduce the number of other candidates from four to two.
>
> The idea is that if the candidate were to be cloned, then these clones
> would occupy three spots of the outcome, so the result is the same; just
> in one case, there's only one winner from that bloc and two "holes",
> while in the other case, there would be three winners from the bloc.
>
> I would probably reserve one of the five spots for the primary CW,
> though. Ideally it would use a proportional ordering or a pairwise STV
> variant, but then we're moving into "deluxe, complex method" territory.
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