[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV

[Forest Simmons]

For us old lazy guys who sometimes need help seeing the obvious ... how
about a couple of pertinent examples with their most pertinent features
high lighted?

On Sat, Aug 5, 2023, 8:29 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> This idea is inspired by our recent and ongoing "war on Burial".
>
> Approval-enhanced IRV
>
> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they choose
> and have the option of
> marking their highest-ranked approved candidate. Default approval is to
> only the candidate ranked
> above all others.
>
> Find the winner of the pairwise comparison between the IRV winner and
> the candidate X with the most
> approval opposition to the IRV winner.
>
> The IRV winner is elected if it wins (or say if ties) that pairwise
> comparison.
>
> If X wins it, then do the whole thing again as if all ballots truncate
> just below X.
>
> If that doesn't produce a new winner, then elect X.
>
> If it does, then elect the original IRV winner.*
>
> This should hang on to LNHelp while meeting modified versions of LNHarm
> and Minimal Defense.
>
> Here is a  maybe-good-enough-most-of-the-time shorter prettier variation:
>
> *Voters strictly rank from the top however many candidates they choose
> and have the option of
> marking their highest-ranked approved candidate. Default approval is to
> only the candidate ranked
> above all others.
>
> If the IRV winner is also the most approved candidate then it is elected.
>
> Otherwise elect the winner of the pairwise comparison between the IRV
> winner and the candidate
> with the most approval opposition to the IRV winner.*
>
> Not a Condorcet method and probably nothing like a practical proposal.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>
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