[EM] Method X

[Forest Simmons]

Restricting to Smith requires lots of first place vote transfers ... right?

So what about (for each candidate X) just bequeathing all of X's first
place assets to the Smith member Y against which X has the fewest losing
votes?

And how about applying this idea more generally to restrict Asset DSV to
Smith?

On Wed, Aug 2, 2023, 4:15 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 8/2/23 07:07, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Thanks for opening up new vistas!
> >
> > How about restricting method X to Smith?
> >
> > Or using some other method to pare down the field to manageable size?
>
> It's even more strange if I do so. Here's Smith//X:
>
> Burial, no compromise:  4262    0.0875496
> Compromise, no burial:  9268    0.190382
> Burial and compromise:  1933    0.0397075
> Two-sided:              8103    0.166451
> Other coalition strats: 0       0
> ==========================================
> Manipulable elections:  23566   0.48409
>
> See how there's no "Other"? So it too most likely is monotone! Just how
> is that possible? Schwartz//X is monotone too.
>
> (I don't think the difference between manipulability here and for
> Smith,IRV is significant, as much as it would be fun to say I've not
> just met but beat IRV :-)
>
> I tried to check Landau//X. It had plenty of Other strats, which is not
> unexpected given your proof about independence of covered alternatives
> plus first preference tiebreak implying nonmonotonicity... but I think
> my implementation of Landau is suspect, so I'm not including it here.
>
> I could try other variants like "whenever someone is eliminated,
> everybody he beats pairwise must also be eliminated". If that were done
> on a global ordering (like IRV), that should give us Landau (and
> Banks?), but I don't know if our method construction guidelines still
> hold when the elimination order is different for different candidates.
> This is rather uncharted territory!
>
> -km
>
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