[EM] Note on maximally beneficial elimination
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Apr 18 12:00:55 PDT 2023
I forgot to say that a "maximally beneficial elimination" method can
trivially be made ISDA by constraining the elimination order to
eliminate every non-Smith candidate, i.e. the remaining candidate/s
besides A himself can't be outside the Smith set. But this is just
Smith//X and thus probably not monotone (consider e.g. Smith//Plurality
as proof that Smith//X may be nonmonotone even if X is monotone).
But perhaps a Benham type constraint would preserve monotonicity while
passing Smith (though it would likely fail ISDA). Let the Benham
elimination according to some order be:
- At each step, eliminate the candidate at the end of the elimination order
UNLESS that candidate beats every remaining candidate pairwise,
in which case eliminate the next to last instead.
A's score still involves finding some elimination order that maximizes
the score of A according to the base method once all but a certain
number of candidates have been eliminated. But maybe this Benham MBE is
monotone?
If the base method passes Condorcet (e.g. first preference Copeland or
Friendly Cover) then if W is the CW, every other candidate will have a
lower score than W when using Benham MBE.
And perhaps some clever adaptation of Tideman's alternative methods
could get us ISDA. Still no clone independence, though... I don't think?
(It would be something like: the order is constrained to get rid of
non-Smith first. Then it can eliminate in any arbitrary order until
there is a distinct Smith set among the remaining candidates, after
which this Smith set must similarly be eliminated before more arbitrary
candidates can be eliminated. In either case, A is always spared when
calculating A's score. This *sounds* like a variant of the Smith//X
thing and possibly would not be monotone.)
-km
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