[EM] Ultimate SPE Agenda Processing: Sink Swap Bubble

[Forest Simmons]

On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, 5:11 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> OK ... lacking an ndefeated candidate to elect ...
>
> 1. Use the RCV ballot informatioren to construct an elimination agenda ...
> a list of the candidates with the less favorable near the top of the list,
> and the more favorable near the bottom.
>
> 2.This list is to be published a week or ten days before the runoff.
>
> 3. The runoff ballot is an official copy of this agenda with the following
> accompanying instructions:
>
> 4. Put a check mark next to the name of every candidate you like better
> than any of the candidates listed below it. The check mark is an
> abbreviation for BTAOTB "Better Than Any of the Below"
>
> 5. Elect the highest candidate on the list that has a BTAOTB check mark on
> more than 50% of the submitted ballots.
>
> 6. The candidate listed last (bottom) is the default winner (when no other
> candidate is preferred over "The Below" by a full majority of the
> participating voters).
>

Or perhaps append NOTA (None Of The Above) as the last option.

Another possibility (for the case of no candidate getting a full majority)
is to elect the plurality winner ... the one with the most check marks to
her name.

So elect the first agenda candidate to get a full majority ... or lacking
that, the Plurality winner ... unless NOTA gets a majority ... which would
be like a miss trial requiring a new election ... or something.

>
> All registered voters should be able to  participate in this runoff, even
> if they did not participate in the first round (the check for a candidate
> undefeated pairwise).
>
> It seems to me that the simplicity and importance of the runoff would
> attract excellent participation.
>
> Thoughts and suggestions?
>
> -Forest
>
> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 1:52 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
>
>> On 11.04.2023 19:55, Forest Simmons wrote:
>> > Suppose someone provides a list of candidates already sorted pairwise.
>> >
>> > Now do Benham elimination ... start at the loser end of the list and
>> > eliminate candidates one by one until there is (according to a fresh
>> set
>> > of ballots) a CW among the uneliminated.
>> >
>> > How much incentive if any to rank insincerely?
>>
>> Since Condorcet is incompatible with LNH, there will be some incentive
>> to either truncate or random-fill (depending on the situation). I would
>> also imagine that if the strategists know the list ahead of time, and
>> they know that it's A>B>C>D, then if C is the CW, A is their favorite,
>> and A beats B pairwise, they'll have an incentive to engineer a false
>> cycle by burying C under B.
>>
>> If they don't know the list, it's much harder to do. It reminds me of
>> the Conitzer and Sandholm preround, which makes strategy harder to
>> devise in practice, and just how hard depends on what information the
>> strategists have (see
>> https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/voting_tweaks.ijcai03.pdf). (In
>> practice, this doesn't matter, because most elections have relatively
>> few candidates; it's just the "it depends on information" aspect that's
>> similar.)
>>
>> -km
>>
>
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