[EM] STAR cloneproof variant based on Score Chain Climbing

Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Sat Mar 12 00:16:50 PST 2022

Thanks, Kevin. It was a comment of yours that made me realize that burial
punishment (via chain climbing) was not enough ... but of course, looking
away and pretending the burier was probably sincere ... that is no good

So a sincerity check is natural ... if the sincere ballots contradict the
strategic ballots, then in this case you have both detection and correction.

Perhaps we could forget Chain Climbing and just use the sincerity check on
the weakest defeat that was critical in determining the winner.

El vie., 11 de mar. de 2022 11:42 p. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hi Forest,
> Le vendredi 11 mars 2022, 23:03:30 UTC−6, Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> a écrit :
> > SCC:
> >
> > Initialize a variable X as the (name of) the lowest score candidate.
> Then ...
> >
> > While more than one candidate remains, eliminate all of the candidates
> pairwise
> > defeated by X, before storing a new name into X, the name of the lowest
> score
> > remaining candidate.
> > EndWhile
> >
> > The last value of X (the SCC winner Xf) is one of the finalists.
> >
> > The other finalist is the second to the last value of X, which we
> designate Xf'.
> For the case that the initial value of X is the CW, should an elimination
> order
> be specified?
> > But doesn't the last X defeat all of the previous X's?
> >
> > Yes, according to the ballots. But there is a good chance that the only
> reason
> > Xf defeats Xf' on the ballots is that Xf' was insincerely buried under
> Xf.
> In my terminology, that would mean Xf' is the sincere CW and Xf is the
> "pawn."
> The strategists' own candidate (the "rival") has been eliminated, so their
> strategy failed (and would be a backfire, if the last X simply won).
> This probably implies that the sincere CW was unexpectedly the Score loser.
> > So how do we vindicate (or expose as fraudulent) the finalist Xf?
> >
> > We could take another trip to the polls for a runoff between between Xf
> and Xf'.
> >
> > Otherwise, we can require voters to submit two ballots ... one to
> determine the
> > two finalists, and the other to choose between them.
> >
> > Sincere voters simply duplicate their first ballot to produce their
> second one.
> > The strategy burdened voters adjust their insincerities to produce their
> second
> > ballot.
> >
> > It is crucial that the second ballot be used exclusively for choosing
> the winner
> > between the two finalists.
> >
> > However, once the final winner has been certified , these ballots can be
> used
> > for forensics.
> All true. It seems like the effect of this is to make "backfired strategy"
> outcomes impossible. Is that the goal? It seems like that might risk
> encouraging
> voters to *try* burial strategies, unless it's sufficient to "name and
> shame"
> strategists through the forensics performed afterwards.
> It seems like this proposal could even prevent a backfire when *both* of
> two
> major factions are ranking the same pawn insincerely high, so that the pawn
> becomes the voted CW.
> Kevin
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