[EM] STAR cloneproof variant based on Score Chain Climbing

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Mar 11 23:41:13 PST 2022

Hi Forest,

Le vendredi 11 mars 2022, 23:03:30 UTC−6, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> a écrit :
> SCC:
> Initialize a variable X as the (name of) the lowest score candidate. Then ...
> While more than one candidate remains, eliminate all of the candidates pairwise
> defeated by X, before storing a new name into X, the name of the lowest score
> remaining candidate.
> EndWhile
> The last value of X (the SCC winner Xf) is one of the finalists.
> The other finalist is the second to the last value of X, which we designate Xf'.

For the case that the initial value of X is the CW, should an elimination order
be specified?
> But doesn't the last X defeat all of the previous X's?
> Yes, according to the ballots. But there is a good chance that the only reason
> Xf defeats Xf' on the ballots is that Xf' was insincerely buried under Xf.

In my terminology, that would mean Xf' is the sincere CW and Xf is the "pawn."
The strategists' own candidate (the "rival") has been eliminated, so their
strategy failed (and would be a backfire, if the last X simply won).

This probably implies that the sincere CW was unexpectedly the Score loser.

> So how do we vindicate (or expose as fraudulent) the finalist Xf?
> We could take another trip to the polls for a runoff between between Xf and Xf'.
> Otherwise, we can require voters to submit two ballots ... one to determine the
> two finalists, and the other to choose between them.
> Sincere voters simply duplicate their first ballot to produce their second one.
> The strategy burdened voters adjust their insincerities to produce their second
> ballot.
> It is crucial that the second ballot be used exclusively for choosing the winner
> between the two finalists.
> However, once the final winner has been certified , these ballots can be used
> for forensics.

All true. It seems like the effect of this is to make "backfired strategy"
outcomes impossible. Is that the goal? It seems like that might risk encouraging
voters to *try* burial strategies, unless it's sufficient to "name and shame"
strategists through the forensics performed afterwards.

It seems like this proposal could even prevent a backfire when *both* of two
major factions are ranking the same pawn insincerely high, so that the pawn
becomes the voted CW.


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